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I. Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in the empirical evidence on the 
effectiveness of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) in developed, developing and 
transition economies.1  This improvement can be explained by the increased availability of 
data, the improvements on data quality, and recent developments on evaluation methodology.  
However, most of these studies focus on comparing the labour market outcomes of 
unemployed individuals who participate in an ALMP with other unemployed individuals who 
do not participate in an ALMP—at least during a pre-determined span of time.   
 
While evaluating the effects of ALMPs relative to non-participation is an interesting question 
per se, policy makers may well be more interested on what are the relative effects of two 
different types of programmes, as well as the suitability of these programmes for different target 
groups.2  More specifically, for the two ALMPs—that is, small-business assistance 
programmes and employment services—that recent empirical studies indicate are often 
successful at getting the unemployed back to work, a useful policy question may be: which one 
is more effective and for whom.  This paper provides some evidence on which of these two types 
of programmes’ works best for different population subgroups in Romania.  The results offer 
interesting policy recommendations for implementing these programmes both in transition 
countries and countries with large informal sectors, such as developing countries.  The focus is 
on the direct effects of the programmes; no attempt is made to assess the general equilibrium 
implications.  
 
 There are considerable differences in the design of these two types of programmes.  On 
the one hand, small-business assistance programmes are usually intended to support the start-
up and development of self-employment endeavours or micro-enterprises. They usually 
provide counselling and assistance in developing and implementing a business plan, and often 
include some form of financial assistance.  Although the use of these programmes has been 
limited compared to other ALMPs, their popularity (as well as the number of empirical 
evaluations available) has recently increased (Kluve, 2006).  Employment services, on the 
other hand, include different types of measures aimed at improving job search efficiency.  
They usually include the following types of services: job clubs, job-search courses, 
counselling, testing, and assessment.  Moreover, because of their relatively low costs, 
employment services tend to be the most cost-effective (Martin, 1998, Dar and Tzannatos, 
1999, and Kluve, 2006, among others).  
 
Despite the institutional differences between these two programmes, recent empirical 
evidence highlights their success at getting the unemployed back to work.  According to 
Kluve, 2006, a consistent result for both Europe and the US are the positive effects for 
employment services, and small-business assistance programmes. Martin and Grubb, 2001, 
also find that these programmes are successful at getting the unemployed back to work in 
developed countries.  In addition, Dar and Tzannatos, 1999, and Betcherman, Olivas and Dar, 
2004, find that both of these programmes tend to be successful in developing, and transition 
countries.   
 
                                                 
1 See Katz, 1994, Fay, 1996, Martin, 1998, Dar and Tzannatos, 1999, Martin and Grubb, 2001, Kluve and 
Schmidt, 2002, and Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar, 2004, for good reviews of the literature. 
2 A methodological question also arises since most of these studies use non-experimental approaches to estimate 
the impact of the programmes.  While non-participants may well be intrinsically different to participants, the 
difference between participants of different types of ALMPs may not be as large (see discussion in Section IV). 
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To my knowledge, there is no theoretical and comparative empirical research devoted to 
analysing the relative effects of employment services and small-business assistance 
programmes.3  The main reason for this is that the latter type of programmes has, until 
recently, been seldom used, and thus data allowing comparison of these two types of 
programmes in the same country are rarely available.  While cross-country studies of these 
two types of programmes are possible, differences in labour market conditions, institutions, 
evaluation designs, availability of outcome variables, and time periods seriously complicate 
the analysis. 
 
Romania can be used to study the differences between employment services and small-
business assistance programmes because these two programmes were the first major ALMPs 
implemented in Romania on a large national scale after the 1989 Revolution.  Moreover, these 
programmes were targeted at more or less the same population of unemployed.  Furthermore, 
the experience of Romania ought to be of interest to policymakers of other countries, 
especially transition economies, which have suffered soaring labour surplus after social, 
economic, and political reforms, and developing countries that, like transition economies, tend 
to have large informal sectors.  Finally, a rich data set (collected specifically for this 
evaluation) provided good quality data on key variables—such as earnings for both the 
employed and the self-employed, and allowed me to track individuals’ earnings and 
employment status at different points in time over a four-year period.  
 
 The data, a random sample of 3,357 persons who registered at the Employment Bureau 
during 1999, was collected during January and February 2002.  Thus, we observe individuals 
at least 24 months after the programmes started. About two fifth of this sample (1,408 
individuals) were ALMP participants whose programme contract began in 1999.  The rest of 
the sample—the potential comparison group—were 1,949 persons who were registered at the 
Employment Bureau around the same time and in the same county than participants but who 
had not participated in an ALMP.  This database was previously used by Benus and 
Rodriguez-Planas, 2007, (BR, hereafter) for a microeconomic evaluation study of several 
active labour market policies.  Their study focuses on the effects of ALMPs relative to non-
participation, and finds that participants of both programmes improved participants' economic 
outcomes compared to non-participants.  However, their paper does not address the relative 
effectiveness of these two programmes, nor does it discuss theoretical implications of both 
programmes and contrasts them with heterogeneity results. 
 
 Since the primary objective of both programmes is to get the unemployed individuals 
back into the primary labour market, and with a job, at least implicitly as good as the previous 
one, the current analysis focuses in outcomes that measure workers’ reemployment 
probabilities (in paid or self-employed jobs), and their earnings at the new job.  These 
outcomes are measured at two different points in time: at the time of the survey, and during 
the two-year period prior to the survey, that is, during the years 2000 and 2001.  I also include 
duration of the unemployment spell and months receiving unemployment benefits during the 
two-year period 2000-2001. 
                                                 
3 Microeconometric studies looking at the relative effects of programmemes in one country include, among 
others, Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon, 1997, Carling and Gustafson, 1999, Melkersson, 1999a,b, Brodaty, 
Crépon and Fougère, 2000, Frölich, Heshmati and Lechner, 2000, Johansson and Martinsson, 2000, Gerfin and 
Lechner, 2002, Larsson, 2003, Carling and Richardson, 2004, Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger, 2005, and Sianesi, 
2005.  However, none of these studies compares the relative effect of small business assistance programmes 
compared to employment services. 
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 I base the analysis on the conditional independence assumption (CIA), and use matching 
methods to estimate the average treatment effect.  A part of the paper is devoted to discussing the 
plausibility of the CIA in this context.  One of the biggest challenges when evaluating ALMPs in 
transition economies is the quality and quantity of data—see Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt, 
1999, or Earle and Pauna, 1996, among others, for discussion on the poor quality of ALMPs’ 
data in transition economies.  I argue that the data used contains important baseline 
information—in particular, pre-treatment earnings, employment history and experience 
information—making the CIA assumption more plausible.  
 
 The analysis reveals that average effects for the population as a whole may hide 
statistically and economically significant differences across subgroups.  While, I find that 
employment services (ES) are, on average, more successful than small-business assistance 
programmes (SBA), estimation of heterogeneity effects reveals that, compared to non-
participation, ES are effective for workers with little access to informal search channels—
such as young workers, and those living in rural areas, and SBA works for less-qualified 
workers or those living in rural areas.  In addition, I find that while both programmes have 
positive effects for workers with and without a high-school degree, ES is superior to SBA for 
the latter, while the opposite is true for the former. 
 
 In summary, this paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, by focussing on 
the two programmes, I am able to analyse their differences in participant selection and 
outcomes in a more profound and informative way than BR.  Second, following Gerfin, 
Lechner and Steiger, 2005, I relate these differences to the different institutional set-ups and 
discuss theoretical implications, which are then empirically contrasted with the heterogeneity 
effects.  This analysis offers evidence consistent with improved job matching theory for ES, 
and human capital and positive signalling theories for SBA.  Finally, the findings in the paper 
suggest important policy implications since they provide some guidance on which populations 
would benefit from ES in economies with large informal sectors, and which type of workers 
are most likely to succeed when participating in SBA in transition economies.  
   
 This paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents an overview of the 
Romanian labour market, focusing on self-employment, unemployment and the ALMPs under 
evaluation. Section three summarises previous empirical findings.  Section four describes the 
data, sample selection and displays the descriptive statistics.  Section five discusses the 
economic evaluation strategy and the empirical implementation.  Section six displays the 
results from a multiple treatment evaluation framework using a ‘matching propensity score’ 
estimator.  Section seven concludes with a discussion on policy implications and cost-
effectiveness. 
  
  
II. Economic and Institutional Background 
  
II.1.  The Economic Context 
 Since 1989, Romania has been in transition to a market economy.  This transition has been 
slow partly as a result of Romania’s stop-and-go approach to the restructuring and the reform 
process.  Since the 1989 Revolution, successive governments have adopted a cautious approach 
to market-oriented reforms.  This slow pace of reform—relative to some of its neighbours in 
Central Europe—delayed needed structural changes and added greater difficulties to the already 
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unfavourable set of initial conditions inherited from the previous regime.   
 
 As shown in Figure 1, after an initial economic contraction in the early 1990s due to the 
increase of external competition and the abolition of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), Romania applied a macro-stabilization programme and experienced a partial economic 
recovery beginning in 1992, similar to the one observed in leading transition economies in 
Central Europe.  However, in contrast with these leading economies, Romania lived a second 
period of economic decline beginning in 1996, which was mainly caused by the lack of 
enterprise restructuring.  In the second half of 1996, Romania’s authorities took a series of 
decisions with the aim of accelerating the privatisation, restructuring and liquidation of 
unprofitable business.  However, the recovery was slow and did not produce significant 
economic results until the year 2000.  Since then the Romania economy has grown at an average 
of 4 or 5 % per year. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Romania Economic Indicators, 1990-1999
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 The collapse in output at the beginning of the 1990s prompted an increase in unemployment. 
As seen in Figure 1, following the fall in output, registered unemployment soared and reached 
over 10 percent of the labour force in 1994.  The unemployment rate then fell temporarily during 
1995 and 1996, only to rise rapidly thereafter, reaching 11.5 percent in 1999.  Since then, the 
registered unemployment rate has fallen gradually to 9 percent of the labour force in 2001.   
 
 Moreover, data on registered unemployment in Romania understate the real problem with 
dislocated workers for at least the following three reasons. First, during the 1990s the increase in 
open unemployment was contained by Romania’s policy approach of limiting job destruction by 
adjusting through real wages, combined with a series of early retirement programmes. Even 
though these two policies succeeded in limiting the increase in registered unemployment, it 
pushed workers out of the labour force and into low productivity jobs, primarily in agriculture.4  
                                                 
4 Since this policy approach was abandoned in the late 1990s, some of the initial imbalances are in the process of 
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Second, a high share of Romania’s employment was in subsistence agriculture—the share of 
agricultural employment in Romania in 2001 was 42 percent of total employment (up from 28 
percent of total employment in 1989).  This suggests the existence of a two-tier system 
consisting of a large number of people involved in low productivity jobs and subsistence 
agriculture coexisting with large, potentially profitable but unreformed, farms.  And third, the 
existence of borderline employment categories such as unpaid family helpers, involuntary part-
timers, or people in “technical” unemployment or unpaid leave initiated by the employer to 
measure employment in Romania substantially overstates employment and influences key 
indicators of labour market performance.5  
 
 
II.2.  The Small and Medium Enterprise Sector6 
Despite the slow restructuring process, the Romanian small and medium enterprise (SME) 
sector has been dynamic, and its contribution to employment growth has surged.  While 
SMEs (enterprises with less than 250 employees) accounted for 24% of total employment in 
1995, they represented about 46.9% of total employment and 55.9% of total turnover in the 
economy by 2000.  The private sector contribution to GDP has also grown considerably.  
From contributing 16.4% of GDP in 1990, its contribution almost tripled by 1995 (at 45.3% 
of GDP) and reached 65.5% in the year 2000.   
 
However, in spite of the positive contribution of the SME sector to economic 
transformation, its relative size in Romania is still small compared with the other transition 
economies.  Many factors explain why Romanian SMEs’ sector has been slow to develop.  A 
brief summary of the most relevant ones follows.7  First, Romania lacked of private initiative 
or small firms prior to 1990.  In contrast with other socialist countries where some 
entrepreneurial activities existed during the last years of the communist years, private 
enterprise and entrepreneurship was first legalised in Romania during 1990.  Second, 
Romania’s legislative framework for setting up SMEs has been complex, cluttered, and 
volatile, adding an additional source of uncertainty to entrepreneurship.  Third, the taxation 
level of private entrepreneurs has been high, and additional taxation has been imposed by the 
“special funds contributions”—ad-hoc special purpose taxes levied directly by ministries or 
other public institutions.  Fourth, there have been considerable social and political pressures 
against restructuring of state firms, which has led to a slow privatisation process. Fifth, the 
entrepreneurial tradition has been very weak in Romania, since the communist regime forced 
the artisans to merge into the state productive structures, breaking the chain of familiar 
handicraft tradition.  A consequence of this was that, by 1990, Romania lacked of sons of 
traditionally entrepreneurial families—the backbone of Western European entrepreneurs.   
Finally, SMEs’ financing has been limited and expensive.  Because of the high and variable 
inflation rates, interest rates on lending have been prohibitive for many SMEs.  Moreover, 
access to bank loans was limited to SMEs and when available, they were generally short-term, 
                                                                                                                                                        
being corrected. 
5 See Brown et al., 2006, for a careful study on nonstandard forms and measures of employment and 
unemploymen in Romania. 
6 In Romania, most enterprises in this sector were micro-firms (with less than 10 employees).  For instance, in 
the year 2000, 93.6% of SMEs were micro-firms, 5% were small (with 10 to 49 employees), and 1.4% were 
medium firms (with 50 to 249 employees).  Moreover, 97.4% of total SMEs was private, 0.3% was state-owned, 
and 2.3% were mixed firms. 
7 For thourough studies on the development of SMEs during the transition in Romania, see Ahrend and Martins, 
2003, Dochia, 2000, Ferrari, 1999, Mitrut and Constantin, 2006, Nagarajan and Meyer, 1997a, among others. 
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small and required a collateral (Nagarajan and Meyer, 1997). 
 
   
II.3. The Institutional Environment 
 To address the problem of soaring labour surplus, the Romanian government soon developed 
social safety programmes, including labour market programmes to help the unemployed during 
this transition period.  The programmes combined social insurance and means-tested income 
support with active policies aimed at increasing labour demand and improving matching. 
 
The Romanian Unemployment Programme 
 As early as 1991, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection adopted the Romanian 
Unemployment Programme.  This programme was not a pure social insurance programme since 
it contained provisions for means testing.8  According to this programme, unemployed 
individuals were eligible for financial support through unemployment benefits, allowance for 
vocational integration and support allowance.   To be eligible, an individual had to: be registered 
at the local Labour Office, be aged eighteen and over, have an income less than half of the 
indexed national minimum wage, be unemployed due to liquidation or a lay-off, be employed at 
least six months during the last twelve months, or be a recent graduate from school or university 
unable to find suitable employment.  Unemployment benefits were paid for a maximum duration 
of nine months.  The level of these benefits ranged from 50 to 60 percent of the average monthly 
salary during the last three months of employment for laid-off workers.  For new entrants, 
benefits varied by the level of education and years of experience for those with prior work 
experience.  After exhausting unemployment benefits, those who remained unemployed received 
a support allowance (of 60 percent of the indexed minimum wage) for a maximum period of 18 
months.9   
 
Active Labour Market Programmes 
 With the introduction of social insurance and means-tested income support, the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Protection also adopted several active policies aimed at increasing 
labour demand for youths, improving matching by providing retraining for unemployed 
individuals, and stimulating job creation through credits to businesses.10  However, the extent 
of these active programmes remained very limited (as discussed in Earle et al., 1998).  And 
the need for additional and more diversified measures to support employment emerged 
progressively and became particularly urgent after 1996-1997 when privatisation and 
restructuring accelerated and resulted in massive layoffs. 
 
 In the late 1990s, the Romanian government launched the real start of active labour 
programmes (ALMPs) on a large national scale.  The two major programmes offered were (1) 
                                                 
8 It contained two means-testing elements: a ceiling on land ownership, and a ceiling on personal income of half 
the minimum wage.  However, according to officials from the Ministry of Labor and from local offices the 
ceiling on land ownership was seldomly binding as the inefficiency and corruption of the process of  land 
privatization lead to many new owners without titles.  Thus, there was no proof that the land was theirs, although 
they may have worked it unofficially. The manjor consequence of the ceiling on personal income was 
widespread income under-reporting.   
9 See Earle and Pauna (1998) for a detailed description and thourough analysis of the unemployment benefit and 
support allowance programme in Romania. 
10 The first active measure to be adopted was training and retraining for the unemployed in 1991.  Then in 1992, 
a youth measure was initiated through the labor offices, the Wage Subsidy Programme for New Graduates.  In 
1995, a programme offering loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises that hired at least 50 percent of the 
new hires from the unemployment pool was also launched.   
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employment services (ES), and (2) small business assistance (SBA).  These programmes offered 
counselling and services aiming to facilitate job placement, and job search skills (the former), 
and business start-ups (the latter) to unemployed workers.  Altogether, these two programmes 
served more than 80 percent of the unemployed who received some kind of active labour market 
programme in Romania during that period.11 
 
Implementation of ALMPs 
 Implementation of ALMPs began in 1997 by the National Agency for Employment and 
Vocational Training and the county agencies for Employment and Vocational Training.  
These services were not provided by the county agencies themselves, but were contracted out 
to public or private service providers.  The county agencies were responsible for the public 
announcements of the tenders, conducting the tendering process, and contracting out the 
ALMPs.  
  
 Contracts to service providers were awarded with built-in incentives to improve labour 
market impact such as negotiated levels of job placement and business start-up.  Thus, service 
providers were likely to select those unemployed individuals most likely to succeed in 
completing their programme and accessing employment.  As we shall see in Section IV, this will 
cause selection bias due to a correlation of individual programme participation with the 
outcomes under investigation.   
 
 There were three requisites that prevented duplication of payment and services.  First, 
individual clients could not receive income support payments if they were receiving other 
types of state financed income support, such as unemployment benefits.  Second, individuals 
could not participate in more than one programme.  And third, individuals were not allowed 
to participate more than once in a programme in a period of 24 months. 
 
 
II.4. The Programmes 
 Table 1 summarises the key characteristics of the two programmes under evaluation.  
Below, I provide a more detailed description of the programmes. 
 
Employment Services 
 Clients eligible for this service were offered a variety of employment services, including 
job and social counselling, labour market information, job search assistance, job placement 
services, and relocation assistance.  The duration of these services was limited to 9 months per 
individual.  In addition, those clients receiving relocation assistance could be reimbursed for 
expenses associated with moving to another community—up to $500 U.S. dollars equivalent 
in lei per family (based on submission of receipts).  The programme also offered up to two 
months of salary at the minimum wage. 
 
 Service providers had to demonstrate minimum capabilities to be service providers, such 
as staff qualifications, facilities, financial viability, and placement capability.  Moreover, they 
                                                 
11 Even though two additional programmes (training services and public employment) were also offered at that time, 
their implementation was on a considerably smaller scale as they served less than 20 percent of the clients.  
Moreover, these two programmemes were targeted to more disadvantaged populations—such as the young, the low 
skilled workers and the long-term unemployed.  An evaluation of these programmemes can be found in BR.  
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had to agree to a negotiated job placement rate of at least 10 percent.  Eligible costs included 
staff and administrative personnel costs, rent and utilities, consumable materials, client 
transportation for job interviews, non-durable goods, and depreciation of capital equipment up 
to 20 percent per year.   
 
Small Business Assistance Programmes 
 Provision of these services included initial assessment of the aptitude and skills of 
unemployed persons to start businesses, developing business plans, advising on legal, 
accounting, financial, marketing and sales services issues, assistance in the dialogue with 
local authorities, short-term entrepreneurial courses and training and other consulting services 
to unemployed entrepreneurs who intended to start, or who had started businesses during the 
past 12 months. There were also provisions for short-term working capital loans of up to 
$25,000 U.S. dollars to programme participants.   
 
 Service providers had to agree to a negotiated business start-up rate of at least 5 percent of 
clients initially contacted.  Eligible costs included personnel services, transportation costs, 
rent and utilities, consumable materials and non-durable goods, and capital depreciation up to 
20 percent per year.  Maximum length of initial contract was 12 months. Costs per client had 
to be specified in all contracts, however unit costs could be identified for different categories 
of services by each service provider based on the understanding that all clients did not need 
full services and some may drop out after initial contacts.  Reimbursement to service 
providers was based on the contracted average cost per client, for each category services. 
 
Utilization of the Programmes 
 As indicated in Table 2, between these two ALMPs, there were 180 contracts completed as 
of September 1, 2001, and close to fifty-two thousand clients served.  The placement rate 
among these contracts was close to one fifth.  ES provided assistance to 31,679 individuals at 
an average cost of only 123.74 thousand lei per client (about 12 US dollars per client).  In 
contrast, SBA served a smaller number of clients (20,293 clients) and the cost per client for 
this programme was 179.15 thousand lei per client (about 17 US dollars per client).12 
 
  
III. Previous Empirical Evidence13 
 
III.1.  Employment Services 
 Employment services include different types of measures aimed at improving job search 
efficiency.  They usually include the following types of services: initial interviews at the 
employment offices, job clubs, job-search courses, counselling, testing, and assessment.  Such 
services may be combined with increased monitoring and enforcement of the job-search 
requirement for receipt of unemployment benefits.  Given that, in many countries, the private 
sector provides matching services successfully to some segments of the population, public 
employment services are often justified as being beneficial for the more disadvantaged 
segments of the population, such as the low-skilled and the long-term unemployed (Fretwell 
and Goldberg, 1994, Van der Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006). 
  
                                                 
12 All costs figures have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
13 All of the reviewed studies in this section evaluate the impact of participation in either programme compared 
to non-participation. 
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 In developed countries, most studies find that employment services were successful in 
helping the unemployed workers find better-paid jobs.14  This is true for most experimental 
studies in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.15  Two exceptions 
are: (1) the evaluation of three different employment service strategies in Washington D.C. 
and Florida during 1995 and 1996, which found uneven impacts on employment and earnings 
(Decker et al., 2000); and (2) the evaluation of job-search assistance in Holland, which did not 
find significant results for unemployment insurance recipients with relatively good labour 
market prospects (Van der Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006).  Quasi-experimental studies also 
find successful outcomes for employment services in Australia (Fay, 1996), Austria (Weber 
and Hofer, 2003 and 2004), France (Crépon, Dejemeppe and Gurgand, 2005, and Fougère, 
Pradel, and Roger, 2005), Germany (Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen, 2005), the Netherlands 
(OECD, 2003), New Zealand (NZ DOL, 1995), and the United Kingdom (Van Reenen, 2003, 
Blundell, Costas Dias, Meghir, and Van Reenen, 2004, and Dolton, and O’neil, 2002).  
However, no positive effect was found in Canada or Holland (Fay, 1996).   
 
 Even though the evidence is scarcer in transition countries, the results seem to indicate 
that employment services are also useful into helping the unemployed find work.  To my 
knowledge, five non-experimental studies have evaluated self-employment assistance 
programmes in the following transition countries: Bulgaria (Walsh, Kotzeva, Dolle, and 
Dorenbos, 2001), Czech Republic (Terrel and Storm, 1999), Hungary and Poland (O’Leary, 
1998a), Macedonia (World Bank, 2002), and Romania (BR, 2007).  All of these programmes 
found positive impacts of this type of services on improving employment prospects of 
participants.  However, of the three evaluations that estimated the impact of these services on 
earnings, only in Poland a positive effect was found.16 
 
 According to Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar, 2004, the two studies that evaluate employment 
services in developing countries (Brazil and Uruguay) show that in countries with large informal 
sectors, public employment services may have limited reach as workers may prefer other 
channels of job search (Woltermann, 2002).  In addition, when positive results are found, they 
are linked to better-educated workers (Fawcett, 2001). 
 
 When targeted to specific groups, employment services seem to work best for women on 
welfare (in the United States) and the long-term unemployed (in New Zealand, the Netherlands, 
and the United Kingdom).  In contrast, they do not seem to work well for young workers (in 
Canada, and Holland), or mass layoffs (in Canada).  However, because these studies were 
evaluating employment services targeted to a specific population subgroup, they were unable to 
analyse the relative effectiveness of the programme across different subgroups.   
 
 To identify the population subgroups that are most likely to benefit from a specific active 
labour market programme, it is worthwhile estimating the relative impact of a programme across 
subgroups.  This approach reduces the sensitivity of the results to differences in labour market 
conditions, institutions, evaluation designs, availability of outcome variables, and time periods.  
                                                 
14 This is particularly true under favorable economic conditions and when sufficient public funds are available, 
as pointed out by Dar and Tzannatos, 1999. 
15 See Human Resources Development Canada, 1996, for a review of the Canadian results; Björklund and 
Régner, 1996, for a review of the Swedish evidence, Dolton and O’Neil, 1996, for U.K. evidence; and Meyer, 
1995, and Heckman, Lalonde and Smith, 1999, for reviews of the U.S. studies.   However, it is worthwhile 
noting that the Canadian evidence finds that the earnings gains eventually fade away. 
16 The evaluations conducted in Romania and Hungary found no impact on earnings. 
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When looking at studies that evaluate heterogeneity results, employment services are more 
beneficial for less educated males (in Australia), low skill and less educated workers (France), 
women (in Hungary and Poland), younger workers (in Romania), higher educated youth (in 
Uruguay), workers with histories of short-term unemployment (in Austria and Romania), and 
those living in rural areas (in Romania).     
 
III.2.  Small Business Assistance  
 Small-business assistance programmes are usually intended to support the start-up and 
development of self-employment endeavours or micro-enterprises. They usually provide 
counselling and assistance in developing and implementing a business plan, and often include 
some form of financial assistance.  Although the use of these programmes has been limited 
compared to other ALMPs, their popularity (as well as the number of empirical evaluations 
available) has recently increased (Kluve, 2006). 
 
 When focusing on scientific evaluations (that is, evaluations with a control group), there are 
relatively few studies that evaluate the impact of participating in a small business assistance 
programme.17  About half of these studies focus on business development of participants rather 
than future employment and earnings of participants, in which case either the business survival-
rate indicator is not a net indicator (since it does not involve a comparison with a control group) 
or if compared to a control group, it is one constructed with businesses started by individuals 
who were not previously unemployed. 
 
 The evidence in industrialized countries suggests that small-business assistance programmes 
work, regardless of whether they focus on the business survival rate indicator or the employment 
indicator.  On the one hand, the evaluations that assess whether these programmes can 
effectively support business start-up tend to find that the survival rate is high.  For instance, 
studies in Canada (Graves and Gauthier, 1995), and Germany (Pfeiffer and Reize, 2000, and 
Reize, 2004) find that participants’ business survival rate is high.18  On the other hand, studies 
that evaluate the impact of these on employment and earnings find that positive results for 
employment and mixed results for earnings.19  For instance, controlled experiments in the United 
States suggest that small business assistance is successful for a small group of unemployed 
individuals—such as, highly educated prime-aged men, indicating that this measure may be most 
appropriate for unemployed workers who have entrepreneurial skills and the motivation to 
survive in a competitive environment (Fay, 1996, and Wilson and Adams, 1994). Quasi-
experimental studies find similar results: an evaluation of a self-employment programme offered 
to unemployment insurance claimants in Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, and Pennsylvania in the late 1990s found that participants were four times more likely 
than non-participants to have obtained employment of any kind—either wage or salary job or 
self-employment, (Kosanovich, et al., 2001). In addition, studies in Finland (Nätti, Aho, and 
Halme, 2000), Germany (Baumgartner, and Caliendo, 2007), New Zealand (Perry, 2006), in the 
United Kingdom (Payne, 2000), and Spain (Cueto and Mato, 2006) also find successful results 
for small-business assistance combined with start-up grants.  
                                                 
17 In their 2004 paper, Betcherman, Olivas, and Dar have identified 13 scientific evaluations of small business 
assistance programmes.  Since then, I have identified about half a dozen more.  
18 There are a few exceptions among older studies in Denmark and France (Wilson and Adams, 1994).  In 
addition, Meager, Bates and Cowling, 2003, evaluated business start-up subsidies to young people in the United 
Kingdom and did not find that they had a significant impact on subsequent employment or earnings chances. 
19 Some caution has been to made when evaluating earnings results for the self-employed as they tend to under-
report earnings relative to wage and salary workers. 
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 The results from scientific evaluations in transition countries are also consistent with small 
business assistance programmes increasing the probability of reemployment.  These studies 
found that self-employment assistance programmes in Bulgaria (Walsh, Kotzeva, Dolle, and 
Dorenbos, 2001), Hungary and Poland (O’Leary, 1998a), and Romania (BR, 2007) were 
successful at getting the unemployed back to work.  However, the evidence on earnings is 
mixed.  While the Romanian study found no effect on earnings, the study from Hungary found a 
negative effect, and the study from Poland found a positive one.  The Bulgarian programme did 
not estimate the impact of the programme on earnings.  
 
 The little empirical evidence found in developing countries seems to indicate that small 
business assistance improves the outcomes of its participants with entrepreneurial skills and 
motivation.  For instance, Almeida and Galasso, 2007, find that a very small subset of former 
welfare beneficiaries in Argentina were attracted to a small-business assistance programme 
(mainly female household heads and highly educated workers), and that this programme was 
successful for only a subset of participants, namely younger and more educated workers, and 
those for whom self-employment was related to some ongoing activity.  In addition, a business-
training programme targeted, not to the unemployed, but to female entrepreneurs participating in 
a Peruvian village banking programme indicates that the treatment improved business 
knowledge, revenues, repayment, and client retention rates (Karlan and Valdivia, 2006). 
 
 As already mentioned, heterogeneity analysis suggests that these programmes work best for 
unemployed workers who have entrepreneurial skills and the motivation to survive in a 
competitive environment, such as, highly educated prime-aged males in developed countries or 
young and more educated workers in Argentina.  The evidence in transition economies is more 
mixed and finds that these programmes are beneficial for a more diversified group of workers, 
such as women (in Hungary, Poland, and Romania), older workers (in Hungary, and Poland), 
workers without a high-school diploma (in Romania), and those living in rural areas (in 
Romania).   
 
 
IV. The Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
IV.1.  Data Source 
This study uses data from a follow-up survey of registered unemployed specifically 
designed for this evaluation.20  I shied away from using existing data from the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Protection  for several reasons.  First, I was concerned on the quantity and 
quality of the existing data.  But, more importantly, data from the Ministry lacked several key 
variables needed for our analysis, such as earnings for both the employed and the self-
employed.21 
 
Compared with existing data from the Ministry, our follow-up survey data provided much 
more detailed characteristics of the unemployed individuals, and observed their earnings and 
employment status at different points in time over a four-year period.  Moreover, since official 
                                                 
20 Survey data of registered unemployed specifically collected for a study was also used in Earle and Pauna, 
1996 and Earle and Pauna, 1998. 
21 The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection provides some aggregate classifications on the unemployed each 
month.  These data, although useful, are limited to a few basic dimensions and allow few inferences concerning 
the origins, causes, and incidence of unemployment to be drawn. 
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data is collected in the local labour offices, I was concerned that respondents would be more 
reluctant to fully disclose their earnings to public authorities (as part of tax avoidance strategy) 
than to trained interviewers from an outside independent agency.22   
 
For these reasons, a Romanian private survey firm, Institute of Marketing and Polls (IMAS), 
was contracted to conduct field surveys during January-February 2002.  The study goal was to 
achieve over 4,000 respondents.  Of the 4,839 individuals contacted for interviewing, about 70 
percent responded, leaving us with a sample of 3,357 persons.  As is common in these type of 
studies, response rate was slightly higher for participants (72 percent) than for non-participants 
(68 percent).   
 
IV.2.  Sample Selection 
 The data used in this study, a random sample of almost 3,357 persons who registered at 
the Employment Bureau during 1999, was collected during January and February 2002.  
About two fifth of this sample (1,408 individuals) were ALMP participants of either 
employment services (ES) or small-business assistance (SBA) whose ALMP contract began 
in 1999.23 
 
 To obtain a representative sample of ALMP participants, we randomly selected, for each 
of the programmes, 10% of clients served in the fifteen counties with the largest number of 
clients served in 1999.  These fifteen counties represented 86% of all clients served in 1999.  
Furthermore, an analysis of the economies of these fifteen judets indicates that they 
represented a broad spectrum of the Romanian economy with many sectors represented, 
including heavy industry, mining, agriculture and other sectors.  Moreover, these fifteen 
judets included some of the poorest judets in Romania (Botosoni and Vaslui—north-east 
region) as well as some judets with substantial natural resources and highly developed 
industries (Cluj and Maramures—north-west region).  
 
 The rest of the sample—the potential comparison group—were 1,949 persons who were 
registered at the Employment Bureau around the same time and in the same county than 
participants but who had not participated in an ALMP.24  To select non-participants, we first 
determined, for each of the two ALMPs, the number of participants that were selected for the 
participant sample in each of the counties.  Next, in each county and for each programme, we 
randomly selected a similar number of non-participants from the same Employment Bureau 
register list.  Following recommendations from Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, in 
addition to draw the comparison group from the same local labour market with respect to 
participants, the same questionnaire was used for both participants and non-participants. 
 
                                                 
22 Previous studies have found evidence of this.  For instance, O’Leary et al., 1998, found evidence that 
participants of self-employment assistance programmes in Hungary could have been under-reporting earnings to 
interviewers who worked in local labor offices.  
23 Based on discussions with programme implementation staff, we determined that contracts that begun in 1999 
most accurately reflect the operations of the programmemes.  Prior to 1999, the programmemes were new and 
some of the procedures were not fully implemented.  Contracts that begun after 1999 may not be suitable for the 
evaluation since some may still be in operation or recently finished at the time of the survey and impacts from 
these contracts may not yet be fully reflected in participants’ outcomes.  Thus, our sample was drawn from 
contracts that started during 1999.   
24 Non-participants did not receive employment services, nor did they participate in small-business assistance.  In 
addition, non-participants did not participate in the two other ALMPs—training and public services, which were 
offered at the same time but in a much smaller scale (see footnote 11).  
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 The timing of events (illustrated by Figure 2) goes as follows.  Some of the workers who 
registered at the Employment Bureau during 1999 received services from one of the two 
programmes described in section II.4.  The rest of the workers did not receive any of these 
services.  Although it is possible that some of the programme participants may have continued 
to receive services during the year 2000 (since the maximum duration of the programmes 
varied between 9 and 12 months), this is quite unlikely since, in practice, the length of these 
programmes was considerably shorter.  During January and February of 2002, we interviewed 
the selected sample of participants and non-participants.  All interviewed persons were asked 
three types of questions: (1) questions on employment and earnings at the time of the survey, 
(2) retrospective questions on employment and earnings during the years 2000 and 2001, and 
(3) retrospective questions on employment and earnings during 1998, prior to participating in 
the ALMPs.  Details regarding the outcome variables are given in Section VI.1. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
TIMING OF EVENTS 
 
During 1999 2000 2001 January/February 2002 
Some displaced workers 
registered at Employment 
Bureau participate in one 
of the two  ALMPs.  The 
rest do not participate in 
any ALMP. 
Workers work or look for work.  During 2000, some of 
the ALMP participants may continue to receive 
services. 
Workers are interviewed 
regarding current and 
passed employment 
outcomes, including 
outcomes during 1998. 
 
 
Restriction that all data be available led to a sample of 2,610 individuals (1,109 
participants and 1,501 non-participants).  All the results presented below are robust to using 
all of the observations available for each of the different outcome variables.  However, in 
order to work with the same sample in the whole paper I restricted our sample to have all data 
available. 
 
IV.3.  Descriptive Comparison of Baseline Characteristics of Programme Groups and 
Non-Participants 
Tables 3 and 4 display descriptive statistics for socio-economic variables for participants 
of employment services and small-business assistance, and for non-participants.  Despite the 
small differences observed between ES and SBA participants, SBA participants seem to be 
slightly more advantaged workers than those participating in ES.  In addition, when 
comparing participants to non-participants, the main finding is that non-participants tend to 
have more stable employment histories despite living, on average, in less dynamic areas.  The 
results are summarized below. 
 
Participants in ES and SBA have similar and relatively stable employment histories during 
1998.  This is reflected by the fact that about three fourths of them reported working during 
1998, of which more than four fifths did so for at least 7 months.  There are four major 
differences between these two groups: (1) the level of education attainment, (2) the type of 
region where they live, (3) the length of their employment spell during 1998, and (4) their 
average monthly earnings in 1998.  While participants in SBA tend to be more educated with 
two fifths of them holding a high-school degree and one fifth of them holding a university 
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degree, participants in ES are more likely to live in large urban areas.  Moreover, SBA 
participants were employed for a longer share of the year 1998 than ES participants, since two 
thirds of the former worked for at least 9 months during that year, compared to only half of 
the latter.  Finally, SBA participants worked in better-paid jobs during 1998 than ES 
participants (on average, SBA participants earned 16 percent higher monthly earnings than ES 
participants). 
 
Even though non-participants are similar to ES and SBA participants, there are some 
baseline differences worth highlighting.  First, non-participants have a higher share of men in 
their group.  Second, non-participants are more likely to live in rural areas than participants of 
any of the other two programmes.  Third, non-participants experienced relatively more stable 
employment during 1998, despite living in areas where, on average, the unemployment rate 
was higher.  For example, over four fifths of them were employed during 1998, of which 95 
percent did so during for at least 7 months.  Fourth, non-participants worked in better paid 
jobs during 1998.  And finally, they were much less likely to have received training during 
1998.  
 
Comparing the outcomes of participants in the programmes, the major difference is that 
participants of ES are more likely to have shorter cumulated unemployment spell than SBA 
participants—shown in Table 5 (see section VI for a detailed description of the outcomes of 
interest).  Comparing the outcomes between participants and non-participants, the 
employment experiences of the former are more successful than those of the latter.  These 
figures cannot be interpreted as the causal effects of the programmes. 
 
 
V. Identification and Estimation 
 
V.1.  The Evaluation Problem 
I analyse the effects of the K = 2 different ALMPs (ES and SBA) on employment 
outcomes at the individual level.  In a situation where individuals have multiple treatment 
options, I estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of one ALMP against 
non-participation in any ALMP and of pair wise comparisons of the two programmes.  I also 
analyse the heterogeneity of the estimated ATET by various socio-economic characteristics of 
the treated individuals as explained in Section VII. 
 
The empirical approach follows the framework suggested by Roy (1951), and Rubin 
(1974), and extended by Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) to multiple, mutually exclusive 
states.  Let the potential outcome Yk, k = 1, 2, denote the outcome when a person gets the 
treatment (in this case, participates in one of the two ALMPs described above), and Y0 denote 
the outcome when a person does not participate in any ALMP.  For any individual, only one 
component of {Y0, Y1, Y2} is observable.   
 
Participation in a particular treatment k is indicated by the realization of the random 
variable S, S ∈{1,2}.  This notation allows under the usual assumptions (see Rubin, 1974) to 
define average treatment effect on the treated for pair-wise comparisons of the effect of 
different states: 
 
γk,l = E(Yk–Yl) = EYk - EYl      (1)   
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θk,l = E(Yk–Yl|S = k) = E(Yk|S = k) - E(Yl|S = k)   (2) 
 k ≠ l; k, l ∈{0,1,2}        
 
The shorthand notation E(.|S = k) denotes the mean in the population of all individuals who 
participate in an ALMP, denoted by S = k.   
 
γk,l  denotes the expected (average) effect of the treatment k relative to the treatment l for a 
participant drawn randomly from the population (average treatment effect, ATE). ATEs are 
symmetric.  θk,l shows the expected effect of the programme for those persons who actually 
participated (average treatment on the treated, ATET).  However, we cannot observe the 
counterfactual, E(Yl|S = k), i.e., the average outcome of those persons who participated in the 
programme had they not participated. Thus, without further assumptions, ATETs are not 
identified.  Lechner, 2001, shows that if we can observe all factors that jointly influence 
outcomes and participation decision, then—conditional on those factors (call them X), the 
participation decision and the outcomes are independent.  This property is exploited by the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA).  Note that the ATETs are not symmetric, if 
participants in treatment k and l differ in a way that is related to the distribution of X and if 
the treatment effects vary with X.   
 
V.2.  Is it Plausible to Assume Conditional Independence?  
Our approach for meeting the CIA was to include in the matching process: (1) 
characteristics influencing the decision to participate in ALMP, (2) baseline values of the 
outcomes of interest, (3) variables influencing the outcomes of interest, and (4) variables 
reflecting local labour market conditions, and regional differences in programme 
implementation or local offices’ placement policies.  
 
The characteristics, implementation, and utilization of the different ALMPs as well as the 
characteristics of their participants indicates that the level of education, experience, previous 
earnings, and pre-programme unemployment history are important factors in determining 
whether an individual will participate in any programme, as well as in which of the programmes.  
These factors are also likely to influence the future labour market outcomes, and thus, in order 
for CIA to be plausible, they should be included in the estimation of the propensities. 
  
Demographic characteristics, such as age and gender are also important determinants of 
labour market prospects.  Moreover, family composition and whether the person is the 
family’s main wage earner are also likely to influence individual’s decision to participate in a 
programme or not. 
  
I also include variables that capture the local labour market conditions.  These variables 
measure the different employment opportunities in the judets.  In addition, since differences in 
labour market conditions may favour a different mix of programme and unemployment 
policies, these variables are also a proxy for different policy approaches across counties.   
 
Finally, I include county dummies to capture unobserved local aspects that are likely to be 
correlated with programme implementation and utilization, or local offices’ placement 
policies, and thus relevant for programme-joining decisions and individuals’ potential labour 
market performance.   
 
Although at first sight and relative to studies conducted in developed countries, these data 
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may not seem sufficiently rich to observe all relevant factors, I believe that these data are 
unusually rich for studies conducted in transition economies—see Kluve, Lehmann and 
Schmidt , 1999, or Earle and Pauna, 1996, among others, for discussion on the poor quality of 
ALMPs’ data in transition economies.  For instance, one could argue that, even though I 
control for employment history during 1998, I lack of information on employment history 
prior to 1998 (Heckman and Smith, 1999, point to the importance of controlling for 
employment dynamics prior to programme participation.)  Rich data on employment 
dynamics prior to programme participation in studies on transition economies is unusual.  
Many of these studies do not have any employment information prior to participation 
(Lubyova and Van Ours, 1999, Puhani and Steiner, 1997, and Vodopic, 1999, among others).  
Others have limited information on employment history prior to participation.  For instance, 
while O’Leary 1998, have information on prior employment status and whether the individual 
was a long-term unemployed, they do not control for months employed or unemployed prior 
to programme participation.  A study that has information on the unemployment spell that 
took place right before programme participation is Terrel and Sorm’s JCE 1999 paper.  
However, their information is limited to the year of participants’ unemployment registration, 
which is, at most, the year prior to programme entrance.  Finally, to our knowledge, Kluve, 
Lehman and Schmidt, 1999 and 2002, have the most thorough information on employment 
dynamics prior to participation in transition economies, and again, this information is limited 
to 12-month prior to entering the programme. 
 
Moreover, I have information on 1998 earnings, which can be considered a proxy for both 
workers’ pre-displacement job characteristics and workers’ motivation, ability and soft skills.  
Again, while baseline earnings data may be frequently available in developed countries, they 
are less common in transition economies’ studies.  The only study that I identified that 
controlled for baseline earnings data was Terrel and Sorm’s, 1999.25   
 
Finally, although I lack information on the willingness of the Employment Bureau staff of 
the different local offices to assign people into different programmes, I control for several 
county characteristics that most likely capture most of these local differences.  Thus, I believe 
that our unusually informative data allows us to capture the major effects of unobservable 
variables that are both correlated with potential outcomes and the decision to participation.26 
 
Summarizing, the available data include much, but not all, information on factors, which 
affect the selection and the outcomes.  The crucial question—that is left to the reader to 
decide—is whether there is sufficient information to justify the conditional independence 
assumption.  However, I believe that our data frequently provides variables that contain some 
of this needed key information, and is at least qualitatively equal (if not superior) to data used 
in other evaluations of ALMPs in transition economies.  
 
V.3.  Empirical Implementation 
I used propensity scores to select a group of participants for each treatment group, 
according to the following three steps.  First, I fitted a probit model for the choice between the 
two programmes and non-participation. Table A.1. in the appendix displays the estimation 
                                                 
25 O’Leary et al, 1998, had information on net monthly household earnings, although it is unclear whether this 
information was used to control for selection bias.   
 
26 To my knowledge, I did not find any study on ALMPs in transition economies that had information on local 
labor offices’ willingness to assign people into different programmes. 
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results and provides a more exact description of the variables used in the analysis.  
 
Second, I used the output from this selection model to estimate choice probabilities 
conditional on X (the so-called propensity scores) for each treatment comparison pair.  I then 
imposed the common-support requirement to guarantee that there is an overlap between the 
propensity scores for each pair (see column 9 of Table 6 for number of treated observations 
lost due to this requirement). 
 
Third, for each treatment group member, I selected potential comparison group members 
based on their propensity scores and their judet.  The selection process was done with 
replacement, so that a potential comparison group member could have been matched to more 
than one treatment group member.27  In addition, the selection method used was kernel-based 
matching, which uses all of the comparison units within a predefined propensity score radius 
(or “caliper of 0.01”).28  When there were multiple matches, each non-participant received a 
weight that reflects the number of successful matches within the caliper range. 29  To adjust 
for the additional sources of variability introduced by the estimation of the propensity score as 
well as by the matching process itself, bootstrapped confidence intervals have been calculated 
based on 1,000 resamples.30 
 
V.4.  Matching Quality 
The results in Table 6 show indicators on the quality of the match for each of the two 
ALMPs and for each programme compared to non-participation.  Overall, matching on the 
estimated propensity score balances the X’s in the matched samples extremely well (and 
better than the other versions of matching I experienced with).    
 
 First, to test if the matching procedure is able to balance all the covariates, I estimated the 
median absolute standardized bias before and after the matching (Rosembaum and Rubin, 
1985). This indicator assesses the distance in marginal distributions of the X-variables, and is 
commonly used to evaluate the validity of the match (Sianesi, 2004, Caliendo, Hujer and 
Thomsen, 2005, among others).  Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 show the median standardized 
difference over all covariates before and after the matching took place.  The matching 
procedure balances the distribution of covariates very well since the median absolute 
standardized bias drops from a range between 9.36% and 18.56% before the matching to a 
range between 2.29% to 4.19% after the match.   
 
 Second, comparison of the pseudo-R2’s before and after the matching indicates that after 
the matching there are no systematic differences in the distribution of the covariates between 
the two groups (columns 4 and 5 of Table 6).  Similarly, the P-value of the likelihood test 
                                                 
27 Matching with replacement minimizes the propensity-score distance between the matched comparison units 
and the treatment unit: each treatment unit can be matched to the nearest comparison unit, even if a comparison 
unit is matched more than once.  This is beneficial in terms of bias reduction, but may reduce the precision of the 
estimates.  An additional advantage of matching with replacement instead of without replacement is that the 
results are not sensitive to the order in which the treatment units are matched (Rosembaum, 1995).   
28 I tried alternative matching methods and caliper sizes of 0.05, 0.02, and 0.01. To ensure a good quality match, 
I implemented a caliper of 0.01.  
29 By using more comparison units, one increases the precision of the estimates, but at the cost of increased bias.   
30 Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, derive the asymptotic distribution of kernel-based matching estimators 
and show that bootstrapping is valid to draw inference.  This is an additional advantage of this matching method 
compared to alternative methods, such as nearest neighbour matching, since it allows to circumvent the issues 
regarding nearest neighbour matching raised by Abadie and Imbens, 2006.  
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after the matching rejects joint significance of the regressors, while the opposite was true 
before the matching (column 6 of Table 6). 
  
 
 VI. Programme Impacts 
  
VI.1.  Measurement of Labour Market Outcomes 
Because the primary objective of these policies is to get displaced workers back to work in 
jobs, at least implicitly, as good as the previous one, the analysis focuses in two types of 
outcomes: those that measure workers’ reemployment probabilities (in paid or self-employed 
jobs), and those that measure workers’ earnings at the new job.31  Moreover, since our survey 
included retrospective questions, I measure these outcomes at two different points in time: at 
the time of the survey, and during the two-year period prior to the survey, that is, during the 
years 2000 and 2001.  
 
In addition to measuring employment experience with employment and average usual 
monthly earnings at the time of the survey, I compute two variables that measure the 
reemployment probability for a period of at least 6 and 12 months, respectively, during the 
years 2000 and 2001.  These two variables provide additional information on workers’ 
reemployment experiences over the two-year period prior to the survey, and inform us on the 
workers’ employment attachment over that period.  I also include average usual monthly 
earnings during the two-year period prior to the survey as a proxy for worker’s productivity.  
 
Finally, I include accumulated months of unemployment within the two-year period 2000-
2001 to get a measure on how many months of unemployment programme participation could 
save.  I also computed accumulated months receiving unemployment benefits (UB) during the 
two-year period 2000-2001.  Table 5 summarizes these outcomes by participation status and 
before the matching procedure.  Table A.2 in the Appendix describes the outcomes of interest. 
 
 
VI.2.  Average Results 
 
VI.2.1.  Treatment versus Non-Participation  
 Impacts were estimated as the difference in average outcomes between the treatment and 
the comparison groups.  The estimated ATET and their bootstrapped 95 percent confidence 
intervals are shown in Table 7.  The last two columns of Table 7 show the impacts of 
participation in ES and SBA, respectively, compared to non-participation.  Overall, 
participation in either programme is successful into getting the unemployed back to work 
compared to non-participation. Moreover, participation in ES improves the average realized 
earnings of its participants compared to non-participants.  Below, I summarize the results. 
 
 First, I find that ES was successful in improving participants’ economic outcomes 
compared to non-participants in all dimensions.  ES had a positive impact both on 
employment at the time of the survey and on employment during the two-year period 2000-
                                                 
31 All earnings variables are deflated by gross domestic product (base=1998), and coded as zero if the person is 
reported not working.  This measure of earnings is one of realized earnings and is frequently used in the 
literature, despite being a crude measure of productivity—since earnings are only observed for employed 
individuals.  Recently, Lechner and Melly, 2007, have proposed consistent nonparametric estimators of 
individuals’ earnings capacity as an alternative measure to realized earnings.  
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2001.  For instance, it increased the probability of being employed at the time of the survey 
by 8.45 percentage points, which represents a 19.73% increase in the likelihood of being 
employed at the time of the survey—this employment effect is explained by higher likelihood 
of being employed in a wage and salary job.32  Similarly, ES improved by 6.22 percentage 
points (or 8.56%) and 7.65 percentage points (or 13.72%) the likelihood of being employed 
for at least 6 and 12 months during the two-year period 2000-2001, respectively.  The 
programme also reduced the accumulated number of months participants were, on average, 
unemployed compared to non-participants by almost two months (or 16.74%), and the 
number of months receiving UB payments by almost one month (or 48.37%).  Finally, ES had 
a positive impact on earnings: it increased average current monthly earnings by 57 thousand 
lei (or 22.49%) and average monthly earnings during 2000-2001 by 87 thousand lei (or 
28.44%) compared to the earnings of non-participants. 
 
 I also find that SBA improved its participants’ employment prospects.  More specifically, 
SBA increased by 8.38 percentage points (or 11.89%) the likelihood of being employed for 6 
months during the two-year period 2000-2001.  This programme also reduced the 
accumulated number of months participants were unemployed and receiving UB payments by 
14.94% and 34.25%, respectively.  However, I did not find that SBA increased the average 
monthly earnings of its participants relative to non-participants.  This lack of result could be 
explained by the fact that entrepreneurs are more likely to under-report their earnings than 
wage and salary workers. 
 
 Finding that participation in ES or SBA increases the employment prospects of its 
participants compared to attending no-programme, does not address the question of which of 
these two programmes is the most effective for getting unemployed workers back to work.  
Below, I proceed to answer this question. 
 
VI.2.2.  Pair wise Evaluation of Employment Services and Small-Business Assistance 
Services 
 The first two columns of Table 7 show the pair-wise average outcome differences between 
ES and SBA.  The estimated effects show that in terms of the accumulated employment 
effects, ES was superior to SBA.   
 
 The first column of Table 7 shows that ES was more effective for individuals receiving 
this type of service than if they had participated in a SBA programme instead.  For instance, I 
find that participating in ES increased by 17.28 percentage points (or 34.18%) the likelihood 
of being employed for at least 12 months in the two-year period 2000-2001, and reduced by 
over 3 months (or 27.48%) the spell of unemployment during the same period compared to 
participating in SBA.   
 
 Moreover, SBA participants would have been better off had they participated in ES 
instead.  For example, when the treatment was the SBA programme (column 2 of Table 7), its 
participants had 9.86 percentage points (or 11.53%) and 17.02 percentage points (or 24.65%) 
lower probability of being employed for at least 6 and 12 months, respectively, within the 
years 2000 and 2001.  Moreover, although not statistically significant, the impacts on 
                                                 
32 This result is calculated by dividing the ATET estimate (in this case, 8.45) by the percent of matched non-
participants employed at the time of the survey, which is 42.83 percent. 
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outcomes measured at the time of the survey suggest that SBA participants were less likely to 
be employed at wage and salary jobs than if they had participated in ES instead. 
 
 The main difference that appears when comparing the results between different 
populations defined by treatment status (that is, comparing the first two columns of Table 7) 
concerns the impact on average realized earnings over the period 2000-2001.  I find the 
earnings estimate to be 64 thousand lei (or 14.16%) lower for SBA participants than for ES 
participants, when the treatment was SBA (column 2).  The impact was also negative, 
although not statistically significant, when the treatment status was participation in ES instead 
of SBA (column 1).  This difference could be explained by the fact that I am using a measure 
of realized earnings as opposed to individuals’ true earnings capacity, and thus, the earnings 
measures are a crude measure of productivity, as explained by Lechner and Melly, 2007. 
  
 
VI. 3.  Heterogeneity among Individuals  
 So far, I have considered the average effects for the participants in the different 
programmes.  In summary, I find that ES was superior to SBA, and that both ES and SBA 
were superior to non-participation (this latter result was already found by BR).  However, this 
average analysis does not provide any guidance on why ES might work better than SBA, nor 
does it explore whether the impacts vary with the socio-economic characteristics of its 
participants.  In this section, I discuss competing theories explaining why the different 
programmes may have different effects, and then explore the compatibility of the estimated 
effect heterogeneity with the discussed theories.33 
 
VI.3.1. Theoretical Considerations 
 There are at least three main reasons that could explain why the programmes may have 
different effects: (1) improved job matching; (2) human capital; and (3) signalling. 
 
Improved Job Matching 
 Both programmes may improve job matching for different reasons.  On the one hand, the 
main objective of ES is to improve job search efficiency by increasing the information 
available to potential employers on the amount and quality of the applicants, and by 
improving unemployed workers’ knowledge about potential new employers and new 
occupations.  On the other hand, SBA offers a network and contacts to unemployed workers 
that could (and sometimes does) result in wage and salary job offers.  For instance, more than 
45% of participants of a self-employment assistance programme in New Jersey ended up 
working in wage and salary jobs.  Similar results were found in Maine and New York, where 
close to 60% of participants of self-employment programmes ended up working in wage and 
salary jobs.  The study also reports that most of these wage and salary jobs were full-time jobs 
and, often, in the same industries as those in which participants initially became self-
employed (Kosanovich, et al., 2001).   
 
 It is unclear which of these two programmes would work best at improving job matching.  
A priori, one would think that ES should be more efficient at improving job search then SBA 
since the job matching mechanism for the latter programme is the result of an indirect, and 
thus, secondary effect of the programme.  However, theoretical findings on search channels 
find that the efficiency of employment counselling services alone (that is, without monitoring) 
                                                 
33 Our approach is similar to that of Gerfin, Lechner, and Steiger, 2005. 
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is seriously questionable.  For instance, Van der Berg and Van der Klaauvw, 2006, developed 
a job search model with two search channels—the formal and informal one—and endogenous 
job search, and found that low-intensity job search programmes were useless.  Moreover, 
empirical evidence on employment services in countries with large informal sectors, such as 
transition economies and developing countries, have shown that public employment services 
may have limited reach as workers may prefer other channels of job search (Woltermann, 
2002).   
 
 Human Capital 
 The impact of ES on human capital is likely to be small since the programme does not 
incorporate explicit training.  In contrast, SBA offers some training through the form of advising 
on legal, accounting, financial, marketing and sales services issues, and some short-term 
entrepreneurial courses.  Moreover, there is some empirical evidence that business-training 
programmes improved participants’ business knowledge and productivity, measured by 
revenues, repayment, and client retention rates (Karlan and Valdivia, 2006). 
 
Signalling 
 Finally, participating in SBA may have a signalling value to prospective clients and 
contractors.  Given the little entrepreneurial tradition in Romania, it is likely that prospective 
clients and contractors conclude that individuals who have participated in SBA are better 
entrepreneurs, and are more reliable since they have institutional support than those who did not 
participate in SBA.  Moreover, in order to be a credible signal, participating in SBA must be 
more costly for less productive workers than ES.  Given that SBA involves entrepreneurial 
courses, and writing a business plan, it is likely that participating in SBA is more costly for less 
capable workers than ES. 
 
 Discussion of the Resulting Effects 
 As Gerfin et al., 2005, discuss in their paper, it is not possible to derive strict tests for the 
relative importance of these explanations.  However, systematic heterogeneity of the effects 
between different groups of unemployed will provide evidence consistent with one theory but 
not with another.  I follow their strategy and use non-participation in any programme as a 
benchmark because non-participation will neither have job matching, human capital, or 
signalling effects.  In addition, subgroup estimates comparing the impacts of ES versus SBA 
participation are also provided and discussed.   
 
 Let’s first consider the effect of heterogeneity with respect to age.  I expect ES to work 
better for young workers since they are likely to have less access to informal search channels.  
The empirical literature on the use of different search channels by different types of workers 
indicates that workers with characteristics such that their chances to find a job are low 
because of little access to informal search channels rely to a relatively large extent on formal 
search (Van der Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006, Abbring, Van der Berg and Van Ours, 2005, 
Keeley and Robins, 1985).  Because ES facilitate job finding through the formal channel, I 
would expect it to have strong effects for young workers.  In contrast, for the older workers, I 
would expect a weaker job-matching effect of ES compared to non-participation since these 
workers are likely to have more access to the large informal sector existing in Romania.  On 
the other hand, it is difficult to determine whether the human capital generated by SBA will 
be more beneficial for younger or older workers given that the skill formation of the former 
might have strongly differed to that of latter because of the social, political and economic 
reforms.  Finally, according to the signalling theory, SBA should be more efficient for those 
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workers for whom the costs of participating in SBA would be lower.  Because older workers 
are likely to have more networks and contacts than younger ones, this should lower their costs 
of starting a business compared to those of younger workers.  Thus, if signalling is important, 
I expect SBA to have more of an impact compared to non-participation for older than younger 
workers. 
 
 A similar argument to the one done with respect to age and the use of search channels can 
be done in the case of workers in a labour market with unfavourable circumstances.  In this 
case, the empirical literature also indicates that these workers are more likely to rely on 
formal search channels because access to their informal search channels has dried up.  Given 
that rural areas in Romania in the late 1990s tended to be more economically depressed than 
urban areas, I suspect that ES will have a stronger job-matching effect compared to non-
participation on workers living in rural than urban areas.  On the other hand, if I assume that 
SBA generates human capital by providing knowledge on the possibility and scope of new 
micro-entrepreneurial activities to unemployed workers who have little outside opportunities, 
then individuals living in depressed rural areas are likely to benefit the more from SBA than 
individuals living in urban areas.  This occurs because of the little outside options existent in 
rural versus urban areas and is consistent with the empirical evidence from developed 
countries that finds that facilitating micro-credits in depressed rural areas is an efficient way 
to generate self-employment and economic activity (Karlan and Valdivia, 2006).  Finally, 
because rural areas were more depressed than the urban ones, having access to contacts and 
networks was likely to be more difficult in the former, thus increasing the costs of starting a 
new business.  Therefore if signalling is important, I ought to find more of an impact of SBA 
compared to non-participation in urban than in rural areas. 
 
 Finally, I will consider the effect of heterogeneity with respect to the skill level of the 
unemployed.  It is unclear whether skilled workers in Romania would have more or less 
access to informal channels than unskilled workers, thus the job matching mechanism is 
uninformative on the relative impact of either programme with respect to skill level.  On the 
other hand, the human capital theory does predict a stronger effect of the SBA programme 
compared to non-participation for the less skilled workers if we are willing to assume that: (1) 
the human capital generated by SBA has a certain component of general human capital, which 
will be partly redundant for high skilled workers, and that (2) it is not necessarily increasing 
with productivity.  In contrast, the signalling theory would predict the opposite:  SBA 
signalling effects would be stronger for more qualified workers since they have lower costs of 
acquiring entrepreneurial skills.  For instance, according to Costariol, 1993, in the case of 
Romania, where two generations of artisan tradition were lost during communism, the typical 
private entrepreneur is a first-generation person, middle-aged, mainly with previous 
experience in a managerial position with large scale state-owned companies or, if he is 
young, usually with a University education.  This description of the typical Romanian 
entrepreneur indicates that being more educated facilitates access to entrepreneurial activities.   
 
 
VI.3.2.  Empirical evidence 
 The methodology to estimate the impacts follows the steps described in Section V, 
however, I have previously stratified the sample along the dimensions age, type of region, 
education, unemployment duration, and gender, and subsequently, match within strata.   
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Heterogeneity with Respect to Age 
 I find that, with respect to non-participation, ES improved the economic outcomes of 
younger workers compared to older ones (estimates shown in Table 8).  These results are 
consistent with the improved matching theory since the effects of ES with respect to non-
participation were significantly larger for the subpopulation that is likely to have less access 
to informal search channels.   For instance, I find that younger workers had 26.20 percentage 
points (or 61.02%) higher likelihood of being employed for at least 12 months within the two-
year period 2000-2001 than non-participants.  In the case of older ES participants, this 
likelihood was increased by only 4.12 percentage points (or 7.16%) and the estimate was not 
statistically significant.  This finding is explained by considerably higher likelihood of 
employment for older non-participants (57.58%) compared to younger ones (42.94%), 
suggesting that the latter may find it more difficult to find work through alternative job search 
channels.   
 
 When comparing SBA participants to non-participants, I find that the impact estimates on 
current employment and earnings are larger for older than younger workers (although the 
differences between the two subgroups are not statistically significant).  This result would be 
compatible with the signalling hypothesis.   
 
 Finally, pair-wise comparison of current employment outcomes between ES and SBA 
shows that, with respect to SBA, ES are more effective for younger workers than for older 
ones.  I find that participating in ES increases by 26.52 percentage points (or 46.86%) the 
likelihood of being employed at the time of the survey for younger workers, and that it 
increases their current earnings by 129 thousand lei (or 43.37%).  The estimates for older 
workers are negative although not statistically significant. 
 
Heterogeneity with Respect to Type of Region 
 Above I have argued that ES should also work better for individuals living in rural areas 
compared to those living in urban ones, because the former live in more depressed areas 
where informal search channels have most likely dried up.  The evidence found in Table 9 is 
consistent with this theory.  For instance, I find that ES increases the average wage of its 
participants by 144.24 thousand lei, and reduces the unemployment spell by almost 5 months 
over the period 2000-2001. 
  
In addition, I find that, compared to non-participation, SBA is more successful for 
workers living in rural areas than those living in urban ones.  For instance, participating in 
SBA increased the likelihood of employment for at least 12 months of the two-year period 
2000-2001 by 19.06 percentage points (or 49.16%) and reduced the accumulated spell of UB 
receipt by 3.61 months (or 86.57%) for workers living in rural areas.  No statistically 
significant effects were found for SBA participants living in urban area.  These results are 
compatible with the human capital hypothesis in the sense that, by offering human capital in 
entrepreneurship, SBA widens the scope of activities that seem possible in deprived areas.  In 
addition, they are not compatible with the signalling theory.  
 
 Heterogeneity with Respect to Education 
According to the human capital hypothesis presented above, SBA should have stronger 
effects compared to non-participation for the less skilled workers relative to more skilled 
ones.  However, the opposite is true for the signalling hypothesis. 
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 As a measure of skill I have used whether the worker has a high-school degree or not.  
When comparing SBA to non-participation, the results are consistent with the human capital 
hypothesis.  The estimates in Table 10 show that SBA is beneficial with respect to non-
participation for workers without a high-school diploma.  For instance, I find that, with 
respect to non-participation, SBA increased the probability of being employed for at least 12 
months within the two-year period 2000-2001 by 19.35 percentage points (or 48.51%) for the 
lower educated subgroup—compared to a non-statistically significant increase of 1.45 
percentage points (or 2.44%) for the higher educated one.  This large difference seems to be 
explained by the scarce employment chances among the group of less educated workers, as 
illustrated by a considerably lower average employment likelihood for the lower educated 
workers’ comparison group (of 40%) as compared to the one for the higher educated group of 
non-participants (60%). 
 
However, when comparing ES and SBA, I find that ES works best for workers with less 
than a high-school degree.  This results suggest that for the less educated workers, 
participating in any programme is better than not participating, but that ES tend to be more 
efficient for them than SBA.  In contrast, for workers with at least a high school degree, I find 
that SBA was superior to ES.  This result is compatible with the signalling theory and 
indicates that for more educated workers SBA may be more efficient than ES.  
 
Additional Heterogeneity Analysis 
 In addition to the above results, I have estimated the effects of ES and SBA with respect 
to non-participation for the following sub-populations: males, females, with prior 
unemployment spell below 6 months, and with prior unemployment spell longer than 5 
months (shown in the Appendix Tables A.3. and A.4.). 
 
 I find that, with respect to non-participation, ES improves economic outcomes of 
participating workers with histories of short-term unemployment compared to those with 
histories of long-term unemployment.  In the case of short-term unemployed workers, ES 
reduced the likelihood of being employed 6 months during the 2000-2001 period by 7.55 
percentage points (or 10.25%).  In contrast, ES were not beneficial for the long-term 
unemployed since it did not affect the employment likelihood (although the impact was a 
negative 5.02 percentage points, it was not statistically significant). 
 
 Finally, I also find that the impact estimates on accumulated employment are larger for 
females than for males (although the differences between the two subgroups are not 
statistically significant).   
 
VI.4. Sensitivity Analysis  
 One way to check the robustness of the results is to apply various estimators to the same 
problem to see whether the results differ.  I compared the results obtained by matching to 
some alternative estimators.  Tables 11, 12, and 13 present average impact estimates on 
various employment outcomes and earnings in Romania using four alternative estimators. The 
first set of results (first column of Tables 11 through 13) is gross impact estimates, which 
were not adjusted for observable differences between the participant and non-participants, that 
is, I use the whole sample of non-participants regardless of whether their baseline 
characteristics resembled to those of participants.  The second set of results (second column of 
Tables 11 through 13) is net impact estimates, which were adjusted for demographic and 
regional differences, and earnings, employment, unemployment and training experiences in 
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1998 using multivariate ordinary least squares regression (when the dependent variable was 
continuous) or probit regression (when the dependent variable was a binary variable).  The 
covariates included in the OLS and the probit estimations are the same as those used to 
estimates the propensity scores in Tables 7 through 10, and column 4 of Tables 11 through 13.  
The third set of results are net impact estimates that were computed as simple differences 
between the mean outcome of interest for the participant group and the mean outcome for a 
non-experimentally matched comparison group selected by the same propensity score method 
described in section IV, however, I did not use any of the pre-earnings, pre-employment, and 
pre-unemployment history to match participants to non-participants.  The fourth set of results 
is the estimators presented in section VI.2. and Table 7. 
 
 Below, I summarize the main findings from analysing the sensitivity of the results of 
participating in either ES or SBA compared to non-participation (Tables 12 and 13, 
respectively).  The most obvious overall result in Table 13 is that the unadjusted impact 
estimates (column 1) are generally different from the other estimates (columns 2 through 4).  
In general, the unadjusted impact estimates of SBA were better than the other ones, 
suggesting that operators “cream off” the most qualified candidates among the unemployed 
for this programme.  This finding is consistent with other analyses of ALMP in transition 
economies (O’Leary, 1998 and Kluve, Lehmann, and Schmidt, 2001, among others).  
Moreover, I find that comparing the gross impact estimates with the regression-adjusted 
estimates (column 1 versus column 2 of Table 13) clearly reduces the positive impact of most 
of SBA estimates, reflecting that there is an over-representation of individuals with “better” 
observable characteristics in this group.  Comparing columns 2 and 4 provides us with a 
comparison between results obtained by matching with the standard OLS regression for the 
continuous dependent variables, and a probit model for the discrete dependent variables.  I 
observe that the results obtained by matching reduce the significance of the SBA estimates.  
These differences are presumably explained by the parametric restrictions underlying the OLS 
and probit estimations.  Matching allows for heterogeneity in the treatment effect in a more 
flexible way.  In the case of ES participants, I find that although some “cream off” also seems 
to take place for ES participants, the results are not as strong as those observed for the SBA 
participants (see Table 12).  For instance, regression-adjusting the estimates has little effect on 
ES findings, leaving most estimates unchanged (columns 1 and 2 of Table 12).  Finally, 
comparing estimates from column 3 and 4 enable us to explore the importance of controlling 
for pre-earnings, pre-employment, and pre-unemployment history. I find that these variables 
are important when measuring the effect of the different programmes, as reflected by the fact 
that excluding them changes the size of impact estimates of both programmes.  
 
 
 I now proceed to summarize the main findings from the sensitivity analysis of the relative 
impacts of participating in ES compared to SBA (Table 11).  Again I find that the unadjusted 
impact estimates (column 1) are generally different from the other estimates.  The unadjusted 
impact estimates indicate very few differences in the outcomes of ES and SBA participants.  
The only statistically significant difference is that ES reduced the length of UB receipt by a 
bit more than half a month.  Since the other estimates (columns 2 through 4) reflect a 
superiority of ES, this result suggests that programme operators are more selective when 
choosing SBA participants than ES participants.  This implies that there is an over-
representation of individuals with “better” observable characteristics in the group of SBA 
participants, which is consistent with earlier findings from Tables 12 and 13.  In addition, the 
differences between the OLS and probit estimators on the one hand (column 2), and matching 
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on the other (column 4) are not too large, and overall, both types of estimates are consistent 
with ES being more successful than SBA.  Finally, comparing estimates from the last two 
columns indicates that controlling for employment and earnings baseline characteristics is 
relevant.  
 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Recent empirical evidence has found that employment services and small-business assistance 
programmes are useful active labour market programmes to help get the unemployed back to 
work.  In this paper, I investigate which of these two programmes works best and for whom.  To 
do so, I exploit the fact that these two programmes were the first large scale programmes ever 
implemented in Romania after the 1989 Revolution, that they were targeted at more or less the 
same population of unemployed, and that I have rich informative survey data specially designed 
and collected for the evaluation of these two programmes.  By concentrating in one country, I 
have the advantage that the institutional environment is held constant.  Finally, this paper’s 
findings can be helpful to policy makers from transition economies, as well as those from other 
economies with large informal sectors, such as those in the developing world. 
 
 When estimating the average effects for participants in the programmes, I find ES to be 
more successful than SBA in getting the unemployed back to work.  For instance, I find that 
participating in ES increased by 17.28 percentage points (or 34.18%) the likelihood of being 
employed for at least 12 months in the two-year period 2000-2001, and reduced by over 3 
months (or 27.48%) the spell of unemployment during the same period compared to 
participating in SBA.  Moreover, I also find that even for participants in SBA, ES would have 
been a better option since it would have increased their likelihood of being employed for at 
least 6 and 12 months in the period 2000-2001 by 9.86 percentage points (or 11.53%) and 
17.02 percentage points (or 24.65%), respectively. 
 
 I have explored three alternative theoretical explanations for these findings, and have 
found empirical evidence from the heterogeneity analysis compatible with: (1) improved job 
matching theory for ES (based on the results for the younger workers and those living in rural 
areas); (2) positive human capital effects for SBA (based on the results for the low-educated 
workers and rural workers); and (3) positive signalling effects of SBA (based on the results 
for the high-educated workers.)  
 
 These results suggest the following policy implications.  First, I find that offering ES to 
unemployed workers with good access to the informal job search channel is not a good idea.  
This finding is consistent with earlier findings (Van der Berg and Van der Klaauv, 2006, 
among others).  However, the novelty of this paper is to provide some guidance on which 
populations would benefit from ES in economies with large informal sectors.  In such 
countries, ES ought to be targeted to displaced workers with little access to the informal job 
search channel (such as young workers) or those for whom the informal channel has dried up 
(such as those living in depressed areas.)  Another policy implication is that, in transition 
economies, SBA seems to be an efficient programme for workers living in rural areas.  The 
reason for this is that by improving worker’s capabilities, SBA widens the scope of 
opportunities for unemployed workers in these often depressed areas.  Finally, while, 
compared with non-participation, both ES and SBA are beneficial for workers with and 
without a high-school degree, the findings in this paper suggest that SBA is more appropriate 
for the more educated workers, and ES more helpful for the less educated ones.   
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To address the question of whether these two programmes were cost-effective from 
society’s perspective, I can compare the costs per client of each programme with the 
economic benefits, as reflected in predicted earnings.34  I estimated the average cost per client 
served by dividing the total amount spent in each ALMP by the number of clients served 
(shown in Table 2).  The cost per client served was 123.74 thousand lei for ES and 179.15 
thousand lei for SBA.  To estimate the benefits of the policy, I used the estimated impact of 
these ALMPs on the usual average monthly earnings of their participants.  I preferred using 
the earnings estimates over the 2000-2001 period because they are more likely to represent 
individuals’ earnings than those observed at one point in time.  This amounts to an annual 
sum of  1,047.84 thousand lei for ES, and 4,783.20 thousand lei for SBA (although this 
estimate was not statistically significant).35  In both cases, benefits cover by far the cost per 
client served, indicating that both programmes were cost-effective.36  Given that the cost 
differences between the two programmes were small, and that the heterogeneity analysis 
suggested that SBA was superior for some subgroups and ES for others, the policy 
recommendation is to target each programme to those sub-populations most likely to benefit 
the most from participation. 
 
A caveat in my cost-benefit analysis is that I did not include among potential benefits: (1) 
possible effects on labour market behaviour of the unemployed prior to participation, such as, 
intensifying job search before entering the programmes in order to avoid participation, or 
leaving the labour force and stop collecting UB; (2) reduced criminal activity due to improved 
employment prospects; (3) improvements in the quality of life for participants and their 
families, (4) savings in the deadweight losses due to reduced taxes required to pay 
participants’ future unemployment benefits. Another caveat is that I did not considered in this 
analysis the following potentially important costs: (1) the deadweight loss of taxation to 
finance benefits, subsidies, and operation of programmes; (2) the cost of the leisure forgone 
while participants are in the programme or employed; and (3) possible displacement effects of 
non-subsidized workers.  Given that I ignore the above mentioned benefits and costs, the cost-
effectiveness results have to be taken with some caution.  This is especially true for the SBA 
programme, since this type of programmes can presumably have significant deadweight and 
displacement costs (although, according to Betcherman, Olivas and Dar, 2004, very few 
evaluations tend to provide any empirical evidence of them).  Unfortunately, I cannot address 
this question with the data at hand.  Future research ought to be directed towards this end. 
                                                 
34 When measuring cost-effectiveness from society’s perspective, I measure whether aggregate benefits from 
implementing the policy are greater than the aggregate resources spent by the policy, abstracting from who 
enjoys its benefits and who bears its costs.  Thus, under this perspective, increases in taxes paid due to the 
increased employment of participants or reductions in public assistance of participants are not counted as they 
are transfers from participants to the rest of society. 
35 Estimates were calculated with respect to non-participation. 
36 Given that benefits that accrue within the observation period are above the costs, I did not use a long-term 
perspective to estimate cost-effectiveness.   
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the Two Programmes 
 
 Employment and Relocation Services Small Business Assistance 
Content  Job and social counseling, labor market information, job search 
assistance, job placement services, and relocation assistance 
Initial assessment of the aptitude and skills of unemployed persons to 
start businesses, developing business plans, advising on accounting, 
financial, legal, marketing and sales services issues, assistance in the 
dialogue with local authorities, short-term entrepreneurial courses and 
training and other consulting services 
Duration1  Up to nine months Up to 12 months 
Participants’ 
stipend 
Up to two months of salary at the minimum wage.   
In addition, those clients receiving relocation assistance could be 
reimbursed for expenses associated with moving to another 
community—up to $500 U.S. dollars equivalent in lei per family— 
based on submission of receipts.   
There were provisions for short-term working capital loans of up to 
$25,000 U.S. dollars to programme participants 
Targeted group Unemployed workers Unemployed workers who intended to start, or who had started 
businesses during the past 12 months 
Negotiated 
placement rate 
Of at least 10 percent Of at least 5 percent of clients initially contacted 
 1In practice, the length of these programmes was considerably shorter than the established maximum duration. 
 
Table 2 
Completed ALMP contracts as of September 1, 2001 
 
 
Number of 
contracts Clients served Clients placed Placement rate 
Total cost  
(Lei) 
Cost per client 
(Lei) 
Cost per 
placement  
(Lei) 
Employment and 
relocation services 88 31,679 6,610 20.87% 3,920,060,312.43 123,743.18 593,049.97 
Small business 
assistance 92 20,293 3,568 17.58% 3,635,562,636.30 179,153.53 1,018,935.72 
Note: Costs figures have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Source: USDOL Technical Assistance Support Team.
Table 3 
Baseline Demographic and Regional Characteristics of   
ALMP Participants and Non-Participants, 1998 
(Percentages except where noted) 
 
 
Employment Services 
(1) 
Small-Business 
Assistance 
(2) 
Non-Participants 
(3) 
Characteristics    
Personal characteristics 
Male 45.92    50.69    63.82     
Age    
Less than 31 years old 7.50    4.99    8.93    
Between 31 and 35 years old 14.59    22.71    16.46    
Between 36 and 45 years old 40.16    40.44    36.58    
Between 45 and 50 years old 20.62    17.73    19.79    
More than 50 years old 17.14    14.13    18.25    
Education completed    
Primary school  13.25 9.97    14.86 
Secondary school 45.92   32.41 44.30    
High school 28.65  37.67    29.31    
University 12.82 19.45 11.26 
Family characteristics 
Family size 3.64 (0.05) 
3.59 
(0.62) 
3.65 
(0.03) 
Main family earner 44.31 42.38 46.04 
Regional information 
Region    
 Rural  11.24 5.82 17.92 
Urban with less than 20 
thousand inhabitants 18.34 35.46 18.45 
Urban with 20 - 79 thousand 
inhabitants  20.08 14.13 28.11 
Urban with 80 - 199 thousand 
inhabitants  39.89 27.15 25.98 
Urban with 200 thousand 
inhabitants 10.44 17.45 9.53 
Judet’s unemployment rate 11.86    11.37    13.12    
    
    
Sample size 747 362 1,501 
Standard deviation in parenthesis for continuous variables. 
 
   
 
Table 4 
Baseline Employment Characteristics of   
ALMP Participants and Non-Participants, 1998 
(Percentages except where noted) 
 
 
Employment 
Services 
(1) 
Self-Employment Assistance 
(2) 
Non-Participants 
(3) 
Characteristics    
Work Experience 
Work experience (years) 23.99 (0.30) 
22.99 
(0.42) 
23.63 
(0.23) 
1998 Employment status 
Not employed in 1998 22.36    23.82    19.19     
Employed in 1998 77.64    76.18    80.81     
Employed between 1 and 3 
months in 1998 
4.42    1.39 2.53 
Employed between 4 and 6 
months in 1998 
8.70   6.37    7.40   
Employed between 7 and 9 
months in 1998 
10.71  3.05    5.53    
Employed between 9 and 12 
months in 1998 
53.82  65.37  65.36  
Not employed in 1998 22.36    23.82    19.19     
1998 usual monthly earnings 
Earnings per month    
Under 500 thousand lei  5.22 4.43 3.00 
500 - 600 thousand lei  5.22 3.05 4.46 
601 - 700 thousand lei  9.64 5.82 7.13 
701 - 850 thousand lei  14.19 13.02 12.26 
851 - 1,000 thousand lei  15.66 10.80 14.72 
1,001 - 1,200 thousand lei  13.79 13.30 14.06 
1,201 - 1,500 thousand lei  7.36 13.30 10.79 
1,501 - 1,900 thousand lei  3.88 5.54 6.79 
1,901 - 2,500 thousand lei  1.20 4.16 5.40 
More than 2,500  thousand lei 1.47 2.77 2.20 
Average monthly earnings  
(in thousand lei) 
758.07   
(22.51) 
881.72    
(39.38) 
926.60 
  (17.88) 
Unemployment experience in 1998 
Average unemployment length 
during 1998 (months) 
3.90    
(0.17) 
3.38   
  (0.25) 
2.99    
(0.11) 
Unemployed at least 9 months 
during 1998 23.56    23.27    18.85    
Training experience in 1998 
Received training during 1998 6.69     8.86    3.13    
Average training length during 
1998 (months) 
0.26   
(0.05) 
0.29    
(0.06) 
0.10    
(0.02) 
Sample size 747 362 1,501 
Standard deviation in parenthesis for continuous variables.  Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
Table 5 
Outcomes for ALMP Participants and Non-Participants  
 (Percentages except where noted) 
 
 Employment Services Self-Employment Assistance  
Non-Matched  
Non-Participants 
OUTCOMES    
Current experience    
Employed or  self-employed 51.28 50.86 39.24 
     Employed 48.99 44.73 35.38 
      Self-employed 2.28 6.35 3.40 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 309.64 303.28 232.62 
    
During the two year period 2000-2001    
Employed for at least 6 months 78.87 78.86 68.22 
Employed for at least 12 months 63.39 59.71 51.97 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 394.34 398.60 322.42 
Months unemployed  9.45 10.36 12.14 
Months receiving UB payments 0.79 1.44 1.79 
    
Sample size 747 362 1,501 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator. 
Table 6 
Indicators on the quality of the match, by ALMP 
 
 
Number of 
treated 
before 
(1) 
Number of 
nontreated 
before 
(2) 
Treated as a 
percentage 
of 
nontreated 
before 
(3) 
Probit 
pseudo-R2 
before 
(4) 
Probit 
pseudo-R2 
after 
(5) 
Pr > X2 
After 
(6) 
Median bias 
before 
(7) 
Median bias 
after 
(8) 
Number of 
treated lost 
to common 
support 
after 
(9) 
ES versus SBA 438 247 177.33% 0.200 0.019 0.998 18.56 2.99 37 
SBA versus ES 247 438 56.39% 0.200 0.035 0.743 18.56 4.19 5 
ES vs. No participationa 747 1,028 72.67% 0.174 0.017 0.533 9.36 2.88 4 
SBA vs. No participationa 362 964 37.55% 0.162 0.013 0.985 11.31 2.29 11 
aThe difference in the number of non-participants in the last two rows is explained by the fact that I restricted the sample to have treated and non-treated units come from 
the same local area (judet) and the two ALMPs under study were not implemented in all of the same judets. 
(1) Number of treated, that is, joining an ALMP programme in 1999. 
(2) Number of potential comparisons, that is, persons who had registered at the Employment Bureau in 1999 but did not participate in an ALMP. 
(3) Treated as a percentage of potential comparisons. 
(4) Pseudo-R2 from probit estimation of the joining probability on X, giving an indication of how well the regressors X explain the participants probability. 
(5), (6), (7), and (10) are postmatching indicators on kernel-based matching (1 % caliper). 
(5) Pseudo-R2 from probit estimation of the joining probability on X on the matched samples.   
(6) P-value of the likelihood ratio test after matching.  After matching, the joint significance of the regressors is always rejected.  Before matching, , the joint 
significance of the regressors was never rejected at any significance level, with Pr > X2= 0.0000. 
(7), and (8)   Median absolute standardized bias before and after matching, median taken over all regressors X.  Following Rosembaum and Rubin (1985), for a 
given covariate X, the standardized difference before matching is the difference of the sample means in the full treated and nontreated subsamples as a percentage 
of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the full treated and nontreated groups.  The standardized difference after matching is the difference of 
the sample means in the matched treated, that is, the common support, and matched nontreated subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the 
sample variances in the full nontreated groups:  
 
( ) ( )[ ] 2/.100)( 01
01
XVXV
XX
XBbefore +
−≡   and ( ) ( )[ ] 2/.100)( 01
01
XVXV
XX
XB MMafter +
−≡  
Note that the standardization allows comparisons between variables X and, for a given X, comparisons before and after matching. 
(9) Number of treated individuals falling outside of the common support (based on a caliper of 1 %). 
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Table 7 
Average Treatment Effects of Programmes on the Employment Experience of their Participants 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
Employment services vs.  
Small-business assistance 
(1) 
Small-business assistance 
vs. Employment services 
(2) 
Employment services vs.  
No participation 
(3) 
Small-business assistance 
vs.  
No participation 
(4) 
OUTCOMES     
Current experience     
Employed or  self-employed -1.02 (-10.77; 11.52) 
-5.05 
(-9.92; 2.95) 
8.45 
(3.19; 13.90 ) 
6.14   
(-0.44   12.29 ) 
     Employed 2.30 (-8.11; 13.46) 
-8.34 
(-18.07; 0.38) 
9.72 
(4.17 ; 15.12) 
2.8 
(-3.93 ; 9.55 ) 
      
    Self-employed 
-2.74 
(-5.38; 0.08) 
2.93 
(-0.88; 0.67) 
-1.17   
(-3.75 ;  0.65) 
2.37   
(-1.01 ; 5.30) 
 
 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 
-37.56 
(-133.27; 40.26) 
-25.32 
(-98.78; 36.73) 
56.86 
(1 0.49; 109.51) 
37.58 
(-13.25;  80.12 ) 
     
During the two year period 2000-2001     
Employed for at least 6 months 10.70 (-0.86; 20.86) 
-9.86 
(-19.79; -3.07) 
6.22 
( 2.35 ; 13.52 )    
8.38 
(2.29; 14.13)   
Employed for at least 12 months 17.28 (0.38; 26.70) 
-17.02 
(-26.02; -10.18) 
7.65 
( 2.11 ; 13.73 ) 
7.97 
(-0.20; 14.40) 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) -69.99 (-148.74; 15.99) 
-63.94 
(-140.56; -9.45) 
87.32 
( 56.99; 130.21 ) 
43.08 
(-9.48; 87.58 ) 
Months unemployed  -3.10 
(-4.70; -0.32) 
3.41 
(1.66; 6.10) 
-1.90 
( -3.15 ; -0.9 2) 
-1.82 
( -3.00  -0.54 ) 
Months receiving UB payments -0.45 
(-1.17; 0.87) 
0.74 
(-0.22; 1.47) 
-0.74 
(-1.18 ; -0.29 )   
-0.75 
(-1.50; -0.05) 
Sample size 643 643 1,748 1,311 
Size of treatment group 401 242 743 350 
Size of comparison group 242 401 1,005 961 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
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Table 8 
Average Treatment Effects according to Age 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
Employment services vs.  
Small-business assistance 
(1) 
Employment services vs.  
No participation 
(2) 
Small-business assistance vs.  
No participation 
(3) 
OUTCOMES <36 years >35 years <36 years >35 years <36 years >35 years 
Current experience       
Employed or  self-employed 26.25?  
-1.98? 
 
16.89 
 
6.73 
 
-2.83 
 
9.01 
 
     Employed 27.30?  
1.48? 19.28 6.96 -1.14   5.04 
      Self-employed -1.05  
-3.18 -2.39    -0.19  0.24 2.87   
Average wage  
(in tousand lei) 
129.18? 
 
-71.31? 
 
65.73 60.67 -51.40 58.01 
       
During the two year period 
2000-2001 
      
Employed for at least 6 
months 
9.52 
 
10.11 
 
17.78? 
 
3.96? 
 
9.35 
 
8.31 
 
Employed for at least 12 
months 
15.63 
 
11.54 
 
26.20? 
 
4.12? 
 
12.89 
 
10.76 
 
Average wage  
(in thousand lei) 
-43.76 
 
-82.91 
 
116.62 
 
82.81 
 
5.11 
 
43.27 
 
Months unemployment  -2.25  
-2.27 
 
-4.62? 
 
-1.21? 
 
-2.50 
 
-2.22 
 
Months receiving UB 
payments 
-0.64 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.66 
 
-0.76 
 
-0.71 
 
-0.75 
 
Sample size 124 473 362 1,365 273 955 
Size of treatment group 71 304 159 577 97 254 
Size of comparison group 53 169 203 788 176 701 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
? indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level.   
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Table 9 
Average Treatment Effects according to Type of Region 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
Employment services vs.  
Small-business assistance 
(1) 
Employment services vs.  
No participation 
(2) 
Small-business assistance vs.  
No participation 
(3) 
OUTCOMES Rural areas Urban areas Rural areas Urban areas Rural areas Urban areas 
Current experience       
Employed or  self-employed 7.82  
-1.49 
 
17.93 6.13 9.90 4.00   
     Employed 9.77  
0.37 17.60 8.19 6.82   0.27 
      Self-employed -1.96  
-1.55 0.33   -1.65 3.30 2.31   
Average wage  
(in tousand lei) 
33.64 
 
-64.86 
 
91.54 47.19 36.90 42.54 
       
During the two year period 
2000-2001 
      
Employed for at least 6 
months 
6.16 16.65 7.73 3.68 19.89? 0.06?     
Employed for at least 12 
months 
13.85 18.55 17.25 5.09 19.06? 5.38? 
Average wage  
(in thousand lei) 
81.89 -110.59 144.24? 50.42? 10.28 34.48 
Months unemployment  -2.52 -3.28 -4.87? -0.96? -3.64? -1.20? 
Months receiving UB 
payments 
0.60 -0.96 -1.57 -0.50 -3.61? 
 
0.36? 
Sample size 229 384 454 1,177 427 774 
Size of treatment group 135 268 189 531 142 210 
Size of comparison group 94 116 265 646 285 564 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
? indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 10 
Average Treatment Effects according to Education Achievement 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
Employment services vs.  
Small-business assistance 
(1) 
Employment services vs.  
No participation 
(2) 
Small-business assistance vs.  
No participation 
(3) 
OUTCOMES No HS diploma HS diploma or more No HS diploma HS diploma or more No HS diploma HS diploma or more 
Current experience       
Employed or  self-employed 7.50? -11.61? 5.86 11.28 5.48 5.15 
     Employed 10.43  
-2.25 8.52   11.09 3.47 0.70 
      Self-employed -1.51  
-9.36 -1.92 -0.04 1.00 3.44 
Average wage  
(in tousand lei) 
1.69? 
 
-168.77? 
 
73.48 
 
55.11 
 
20.34 
 
41.30 
 
During the two year period 
2000-2001 
      
Employed for at least 6 months 13.17  
9.70 
 
3.87 
 
6.47 
 
13.45 
 
4.89 
 
Employed for at least 12 
months 
17.34 
 
15.26 
 
5.39 
 
9.13 
 
19.35? 
 
1.45? 
 
Average wage  
(in thousand lei) 
-55.14 
 
-65.56 
 
60.08 
 
97.01 
 
47.95 
 
14.68 
 
Months unemployment  -3.26  
-2.26 
 
-1.40 
 
-1.96 
 
-3.61? -0.57? 
 
Months receiving UB payments -13.81  
-1.27 
 
-0.83 
 
-0.76 
 
-1.93 0.61 
Sample size 293 294 977 725 595 687 
Size of treatment group 204 158 438 296 200 150 
Size of comparison group 89 136 539 429 395 537 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
? indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 11 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Impacts of Employment Services Compared to Small Business Assistance 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
ES vs. SBA ES VS. MATCHED SBA 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to non-
participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES     
Current experience     
Employed -0.25 4.12 1.28 -1.02 
        Employed 4.80 7.67 5.43 2.30 
        Self-employed -4.08 -3.06 -3.70 -2.74 
 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) -2.60 12.72 -25.38 -37.56 
     
During the two year period 2000-2001     
Employed for at least 6 months -0.43 8.63 8.95 10.70 
Employed for at least 12 months 2.96 14.48 13.89 17.28 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) -8.47 8.83 -53.74 -69.99 
Months unemployed  -0.73 -2.75 -2.43 -3.10 
Months receiving UB payments -0.67 -0.90 -0.65 -0.45 
Sample size 1,109 1,109 631 643 
Sample size of the treatment group  747 747 414 401 
Sample size of the comparison group 362 362 217 242 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
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Table 12 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Impacts of Employment Services Compared to Non-Participation 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS VS. NON-PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPANTS VS. MATCHED NON-PARTICIPANTS 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to non-
participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES     
Current experience     
Employed 12.17 12.16 9.81 8.45 
        Employed 13.61 10.67 11.81 9.72 
        Self-employed -1.12   -0.85 -1.17 -1.17 
 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 77.44 78.43 56.32   56.86 
     
During the two year period 2000-2001     
Employed for at least 6 months 10.63 9.83 9.07   6.22 
Employed for at least 12 months 11.49 11.93 11.24    7.65 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 71.97 84.19 62.37   87.32 
Months unemployed  -0.68 -2.40 -2.57 -1.90 
Months receiving UB payments -0.25 -1.17  -1.42  -0.74 
Sample size 2,248 2,248 1,724 1,748 
Sample size of the treatment group  747 747 746 743 
Sample size of the comparison group 1,501 1,501 978 1,005 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
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Table 13 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Impacts of Small-Business Assistance Programme Compared to Non-Participation 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
PARTICIPANTS VS. NON-PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPANTS VS. MATCHED NON-PARTICIPANTS 
 
Difference of Means 
Regression Adjusted 
(using all observable 
variables) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables, with the 
exception of pre-
employment history, to 
match participants to non-
participants) 
Difference of Means 
(using all observable 
variables to match 
participants to non-
participants) 
OUTCOMES     
Current experience     
Employed 12.42 7.68 7.52 6.14   
        Employed 8.82 3.25 4.30 2.80 
        Self-employed 2.96 2.07 2.18 2.39 
 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 80.04 40.50 40.67   37.58 
     
During the two year period 2000-2001     
Employed for at least 6 months 11.06 9.92 10.27   8.38 
Employed for at least 12 months 8.53 8.77 9.11   7.97 
Average monthly earnings (in thousand lei) 80.43 21.09 40.29   43.08 
Months unemployed  -0.99 -1.74 -2.30 -1.82 
Months receiving UB payments -0.17 -0.75 -1.11   -0.75 
Sample size 1,863 1,863 1,318 1,311 
Sample size of the treatment group  362 362 358 350 
Sample size of the comparison group 1,501 1,501 960 961 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
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Table A.1. Estimation of the Propensity Score (marginal effects) 
 
 Coefficient and standard errors 
 ES vs. SBA 
ES vs. Non-
Participation 
SBA vs. Non-
Participation 
Characteristics    
Male -.0925456    
(.1161069) 
-.1427264* 
(.0725004) 
-.2015284* 
(.0926006)   
Age -.1656625    
(.1535611) 
.0140676 
(.0929445) 
.0284343 
(.1061328) 
Age squared   .0020078    
(.0018123) 
-.0001519 
(.0010719) 
-.0004043 
(.0012505) 
Education completed    
Secondary school -.2818174    
(.1904824) 
.0801002 
(.1099728) 
.0398253 
(.1420994) 
High school   -.7095729**    
(.2003055) 
-.0840283 
(.1175862) 
.3389603* 
(.1468737) 
University -.9529029**    
(.2453969) 
-.0083351 
(.1411292) 
.6136505** 
(.1687934) 
Persons in the household    
Three -.0822973    
(.1813362) 
.0232715 
(.1042423) 
.1021722 
(.1271709) 
Four .052221    
(.1731464) 
.133011 
(.1018456) 
.0459635 
(.1259283) 
>four -.1073348     
(.190981) 
.0280627 
(.1143186) 
.0726954 
(.1431552) 
Respondent is the main earner   .3417435    
(.1809325) 
.0962171 
(.1111627) 
-.1547861 
(.1348952) 
Respondent is spouse of main 
earner 
.0569422    
(.1847614) 
-.0487241 
(.1115485) 
-.3095629* 
(.1379943) 
Region    
Urban <20 thousand 
inhabitants 
-1.191507**  
(.2948134) 
-.1270346 
(.1306713) 
.4965981** 
(.1689958) 
Urban (20-79 thousand 
inhabitants) 
-.9827035** 
(.3221553) 
.2316202 
(.124284) 
.2525536 
(.1768784) 
Urban (80-199 thousand 
inhabitants) 
-.1594149    
(.2952032) 
.3309776 
(.119047) 
.0461624 
(.1719474) 
Urban (200 thousand 
inhabitants) 
-4.656347** 
(.8770943) 
-.0189794 
(.1976237) 
.7366886** 
(.2738287) 
Counties’ unemployment rate -1.263342** 
(.1876125) 
.0894544 
(.0627584) 
-.1610341** 
(.0342555) 
Work experience (years)   .0605245    
(.0801103) 
.0307314 
(.0490692) 
.0356114 
(.0539121) 
Experience squared -.0011081    
(.0016136) 
-.0007828 
(.0009607) 
-.0007137 
(.001081) 
1998 employment spell    
1-3 months 
.7215252    
(.4825013) 
-.6807008* 
(.3418347) 
-.9830641* 
(.499512) 
4-6 months  -.114007    (.5612538) 
-.6466339 
(.3363872) 
-.1562037 
(.4336655) 
7-9 months .7544596    (.5603387) 
-.3247323 
(.3236533) 
-.2502013 
(.4274598) 
9-12 month   .0857637     (.484743) 
-.123323 
(.2971646) 
.9910766* 
(.4134734) 
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Table A.1. (Continued) 
Estimation of the Propensity Score (marginal effects) 
 
 Coefficient and standard errors 
 ES vs. SBA ES vs. Non-Participation 
SBA vs. Non-
Participation 
Characteristics    
Average earnings per month in 
1998 
(in thousand lei)  
.0000781    
(.0001593) 
-.0001 
(.0000854) 
-.0000 
(.0000943) 
500-600   .0676088    
(.3362484) 
-.1813 
(.2095827) 
-.2457 
(.2942938) 
601-700 -.0890722    
(.2849194) 
-.2447 
(.1841415) 
-.1330 
(.249114) 
701-850 -.2301096    
(.2499098) 
-.1748 
(.1698717) 
-.0327 
(.2145763) 
851-1,000 .1270668    
(.2534562) 
-.2043 
(.1625509) 
-.2962 
(.2074279) 
1,001-1,200 -.0594705    
(.2571654) 
-.1763 
(.1622569) 
-.3793 
(.1984934) 
1,201-1,500   -.090362    
(.2910924) 
-.3851* 
(.1724099) 
-.1055 
(.1972956) 
1,501-1,900    .0037922    
(.3443563) 
-.4094* 
(.1938586) 
-.3607 
(.2262893) 
1,901-2,500 -.5107524    
(.8254375) 
-.9456** 
(.2595758) 
-.3758 
(.2408035) 
1998 average unemployment 
spell (months) 
  .1290935    
(.1080122) 
.5042** 
(.0673983) 
.3975** 
(.0973285) 
Avg. unemployment spell 
squared 
-.0031777    
(.0090996) 
-.0387** 
(.0071279) 
-.0289** 
(.009252) 
1998 unemployed at least 9 
months 
-.8385808    
(.7934063) 
.2608 
(.5406227) 
.6637 
(.7353178) 
Received training during 1998 -.1745353    
(.6501546) 
-.2614 
(.42072) 
.5994 
(.5026792) 
1998 average training length  
(months) 
-.6527418    
(.4194368) 
.1144 
(.1907319) 
-.0084 
(.2404551) 
Sample size 685 1,775 1,326 
Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo-R2 for all 4 specifications are presented in Table 6, column 4.  
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level. 
Table A.2. 
 
Description of outcome variables 
 
Variables Definition 
At the time of the survey 
Employed or self-employed Person was employed at the time of the survey (dummy variable) 
Employed Person was employed at a wage or salary job at the time of the survey 
(dummy variable) 
Self-employed Person was self-employed at the time of the survey (dummy variable) 
Average monthly earnings  Average monthly earnings at the time of the survey 
During the two year period 2000-2001 
Employed at least 6 months Person has been employed for at least 6 months during the period 
2000-2001 (dummy variable) 
Employed at least 12 months Person has been employed for at least 12 months during the period 
2000-2001 (dummy variable) 
Months unemployed  Number of months the person has been unemployed during the period 
2000-2001  
Months receiving UB payments Number of months the person has been registered with the Public 
Employment Services and receiving unemployment benefits payment 
during the period 2000-2001 
Average monthly earnings Average monthly earnings during the two-year period 2000-2001 
Note: Earnings are deflated by gross domestic product (base=1998). Earnings are coded as zero if person 
reported not working at the time of the survey. 
 
Table A.3. 
Average Treatment Effects according to Pre-Unemployment History 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
Employment services vs.  
Small-business assistance 
(1) 
Employment services vs.  
No participation 
(2) 
Small-business assistance vs.  
No participation 
(3) 
OUTCOMES <6 months >5 months <6 months >5 months <6 months >5 months 
Current experience       
Employed or  self-employed 1.66  
4.49 
 
12.25? 
 
-3.83? 
 
4.29 
 
18.98 
 
     Employed 5.49  
6.76 13.14   -3.49   -0.83   14.93 
      Self-employed -3.43  
-2.27 -0.52 -0.78   3.55 4.09 
Average wage  
(in tousand lei) 
-52.03 
 
27.21 
 
102.01? 
 
-70.20? 
  
31.46 
 
204.01 
 
       
During the two year period 
2000-2001 
      
Employed for at least 6 
months 
15.19 
 
13.29 
 
7.55? 
 
-5.02? 
 
5.64 
 
3.15 
 
Employed for at least 12 
months 
22.31 
 
20.80 
 
7.33 
 
-1.15 
 
3.65 
 
4.35 
 
Average wage  
(in thousand lei) 
-86.44? 
 
55.02? 
 
91.47 
 
18.83 
 
19.68 
 
123.90 
 
Months unemployment  -3.85  
-4.10 
 
-2.04 
 
-0.20 
 
-1.02 
 
-1.55 
 
Months receiving UB 
payments 
-0.95 
 
0.20 
 
-1.00 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.70 
 
-0.01 
 
Sample size 388 189 1,282 324 966 208 
Size of treatment group 256 99 482 213 244 45 
Size of comparison group 132 90 1,282 111 722 163 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
? indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
 
   
                                                    52 
 
Table A.4. 
Average Treatment Effects according to Gender 
 (Percentage points except where noted) 
 
 
Employment and relocation services vs.  
Small business assistance 
(1) 
Employment and relocation services vs.  
No participation 
(2) 
Small business assistance vs.  
No participation 
(3) 
OUTCOMES MALES FEMALES MALES FEMALES MALES FEMALES 
Current experience       
Employed or  self-employed 11.46 -0.92 8.95  
8.24 
 
1.18 
 
2.83 
 
     Employed 13.25  
3.36 11.45 8.20 0.21   -4.32   
      Self-employed -1.79  
-3.24 -2.32 0.15 0.18 6.01 
Average wage  
(in tousand lei) 
59.51 -21.86 
 
85.24 
 
44.19 
 
8.59 
 
23.63 
 
       
During the two year period 
2000-2001 
18.38 
 
11.61 
 
    
Employed for at least 6 
months 
21.07 
 
15.12 
 
6.65 
 
6.83 
 
1.47 
 
13.15 
 
Employed for at least 12 
months 
39.78 
 
-80.88 
 
8.18 
 
9.64 
 
3.68 
 
9.04 
 
Average wage  
(in thousand lei) 
-4.75 
 
-2.25 
 
109.04 
 
59.27 
 
-21.72 
 
46.86 
 
Months unemployment  -0.60  
-0.73 
 
-2.42 
 
-1.79 
 
-1.03 
 
-1.55 
 
Months receiving UB 
payments 
265 314 -0.33? 
 
-1.22? 
 
-0.68 
 
-1.16 
 
Sample size 156 197 901 804 790 463 
Size of treatment group 109 117 338 400 181 175 
Size of comparison group 57 80 563 404 609 288 
Monthly earnings have been deflated using 1998 deflator.  Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level (two-sided test). 
? indicates that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. 
 
